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Abstract 
 
Policy uncertainty is an increasingly important issue facing many economies. In this paper, we 
examine how banks accrue for loan losses in response to policy uncertainty (PU) and the 
implications of these accruals in terms of actual loan losses and future liquidity creation. 
Consistent with banks recognizing more loan losses in anticipation of PU’s depressive effects, 
we document a contemporaneous positive association between PU and loan loss accruals. This 
positive association is more pronounced for banks with a riskier loan portfolio and that have a 
history of lower loan loss reserves. We also find that banks making more loan loss provisions in 
times of higher PU have significantly higher future loan charge-offs and lower future liquidity 
creation. Overall, our paper highlights that PU affects the loan loss accruals of banks and that 
these accruals reflect rational expectations about PU’s depressive effects on the economy.  
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1. Introduction 
A nascent and growing literature examines the implications of policy uncertainty (PU). 
PU refers to uncertainty regarding fiscal, monetary or regulatory policy. Specifically, the 
uncertainty derives from whether existing policy will change in the future or what impact a 
newly introduced policy will have on the private sector. PU has risen significantly in the United 
States for two reasons: i) growth in government spending, taxes and regulation and ii) increased 
political polarization and its impact on the policy-making process and policy choices (Baker et 
al., 2014). Recent research documents that PU impacts the real economy and corporate decisions 
(e.g., Bloom et al., 2012; Baker and Bloom, 2013; Baker, Bloom and Davis, 2016). 
In this paper, we extend the literature by examining whether PU is associated with banks’ 
accrual estimates, specifically, with their loan loss provisions. In the banking industry, loan loss 
provisions are the most significant and economically important proportion of total accruals 
(Beatty and Liao, 2014). Understanding how banks accrue loan losses in times of PU is 
important because banks play a vital role in supplying credit to the economy and accrued losses 
can affect regulatory capital and credit provision (e.g., Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Jiménez et al., 
2012; Beatty and Liao, 2014). However, as we discuss in detail in Section 2, there is ex-ante 
tension in the hypothesis on whether banks make higher or lower loan loss provisions in the face 
of higher PU.  
Recent research documents that policy uncertainty has depressive effects on the real 
economy, e.g., lower GDP growth (Bloom et al., 2012; Baker and Bloom, 2013), lower corporate 
investment and employment (Bhagat and Obreja, 2013; Baker, Bloom and Davis, 2016; Gulen 
and Ion, 2016) and lower production and productivity for firms (Bloom, 2009; Bachmann, 
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Elstener and Sims, 2013).1 These effects are likely to affect a bank’s borrowers’ ability to repay 
their loans. The nature of loan loss provisioning suggests that the amount of loan loss provisions 
provides a useful indication of bank managers’ private information about anticipated loan losses. 
Hence, managers can use loan loss provisions to reveal private information and properly manage 
investors’ expectations. Scholes et al. (1990), for example, demonstrate that bank managers can 
lower their cost of capital by exercising discretion over loan loss provisions to convey their 
private information to investors. In addition, higher loan loss provisions in higher PU periods can 
also demonstrate a willingness to be more proactive in loan loss recognition, which in turn can 
improve the bank’s long-term prospects (Beatty and Liao, 2014). Hence, one might expect banks 
to make higher loan loss provisions in times of higher PU. 
Despite this expectation, adverse macroeconomic conditions can create incentives to hide 
bad news.2 Prior research has shown that banks can hide bad news (e.g., weak earnings and low 
regulatory capital) by reducing loan loss provisions (see the survey by Beatty and Liao, 2014). 
To the extent that higher PU generates more difficult economic conditions (e.g., less demand for 
loans, more loan losses, greater scarcity of capital and downward pressure on regulatory capital), 
banks are likely to face more competition and survival concerns. These adverse conditions 
typically create incentives (e.g., career concerns) to hide bad news (Kothari, Shu and Wysocki, 
2009). Specifically, in the context of banks, one might expect a bank to opportunistically lower 
loan loss provisions to report higher earnings and regulatory capital, possibly to avoid 
perceptions that the bank is weak, losing borrowers and depositors and attracting regulatory 
                                                          
1 The Federal Open Market Committee (2009) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2012, 2013) also suggest 
that uncertainty about US and European economic policies contributed to the steep depression in 2008–2009 and the 
slow recovery afterward. 
2 Many prior studies either argue or provide evidence that managers can have incentives (e.g., career concerns) to 
withhold or delay the disclosure of bad news (e.g., Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal, 2005; Kothari et al., 2009). 
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scrutiny. A large body of banking literature provides evidence on the opportunistic use of loan 
loss provisions (Beatty and Liao, 2014). Furthermore, the uncertainty itself might give banks 
more room to engage in reporting bias (Fischer and Verrecchia, 2000). Hence, one might expect 
banks to report lower loan loss provisions in times of higher PU. 
To study the link between PU and loan loss provisions, we construct a comprehensive 
sample of the US commercial banks identified in call reports. To measure PU, we rely on the PU 
index introduced in Baker, Bloom and Davis (BBD) (2016). This index consists of four 
components. The first and most important component captures PU using a newspaper-based 
approach, based on the frequency of articles in 10 leading US newspapers that contain the 
following trio of terms: ‘‘economic’’ or ‘‘economy’’; ‘‘uncertain’’ or ‘‘uncertainty’’; and one or 
more of ‘‘Congress’’, ‘‘deficit’’, ‘‘Federal Reserve’’, ‘‘legislation’’, ‘‘regulation’’ or ‘‘White 
House’’. The other three components capture tax code expirations, disagreement over CPI 
forecasts and disagreement over government purchases forecasts. Many recent studies have used 
this index to examine the economic consequences of PU (e.g., Bhagat and Obreja, 2013; 
Brogaard and Detzel, 2015; Gulen and Ion, 2016; Kim and Kung, 2017; Nguyen and Phan, 2017).  
We first examine the association between PU and loan loss provisions. If bank managers 
perceive the policy uncertainty and take into account its expected depressive effects, then after 
controlling for other determinants, variation in loan loss provisions should be positively 
associated with PU. If bank managers engage in upwards capital and earnings management when 
facing problems induced by higher PU, then we would observe a negative relation between PU 
and loan loss provisions. Using quarterly data from 1996 to 2016, we find a positive relation 
between PU and loan loss provisions, i.e., the higher the PU is in a specific quarter, ceteris 
paribus, the higher the loan loss provisions will be in the quarter. The effects are statistically and 
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economically significant: on average, when PU is higher by one standard deviation, loan loss 
provisions are higher by 11.42% of the mean value during our sample period. Therefore, the 
main results support the view that bank managers consider PU’s depressive effects and use loan 
loss provisions to signal the loan conditions. 
We conduct a series of cross-sectional tests to explore the heterogeneous effects of PU on 
loan loss provisions. These tests are designed to examine our argument that the key channel 
through which higher PU leads to more accrued loan losses is bank managers’ expectation of 
future economic depressive effects that would adversely affect borrowers. First, to the extent that 
depressive effects indeed drive the relationship, we expect the positive association between loan 
loss provisions and PU to be greater when the banks are riskier because, to such banks, losses are 
expected to be greater when there is a deterioration of economic conditions. As noted earlier, 
prior studies document higher PU to be a harbinger of deteriorating economic conditions. We 
find that the positive association between PU and loan loss provisions is more pronounced for 
banks with a higher proportion of nonperforming loans, those with a lower level of loan type 
diversification and those with a lower level of capital adequacy at the beginning of the quarter in 
which we measure PU and loan loss provisions.  
Next, we examine whether banks that have previously accrued more loan loss reserves 
are more insulated from having to record additional amounts of loan loss provisions when PU is 
higher. Beatty and Liao (2011) find that banks that have been more timely in recording loan 
losses in the past are less adversely affected, in terms of their lending, during recessionary 
periods. In the same spirit, we expect that these banks, because they have already been more 
proactive in accruing expected loan losses, will have less need to record even more expected loan 
losses with the arrival of high PU. Consistent with this expectation, we find that for banks that 
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have historically larger loan loss reserves as a proportion of total nonperforming loans or as a 
multiple of net charge-offs, there is a less pronounced positive association between PU and loan 
loss provisions. Collectively, the evidence from these two cross-sectional tests indicates that loan 
loss provisions’ sensitivity to PU is significantly higher for banks that are more exposed to it, 
which is consistent with the view that with respect to PU, loan loss provisioning reflects bank 
managers’ expectations about future loan losses. 
In addition to economic expectations, two other explanations for high loan loss 
provisions in times of higher PU are i) managers’ attempts to opportunistically shift earnings 
from uncertain to more certain times (Stein and Wang, 2016) and ii) negative managerial 
sentiment not supported by underlying loan conditions (Hribar et al., 2017). To provide evidence 
that making more loan loss provisions during higher PU periods indeed reflects the economic 
expectations about future loan losses, we further examine the association between PU and 
borrowers’ future defaults and how it varies with the current quarter’s loan loss provisions. 
Because the depressive effect of PU is expected to lead to more borrowers defaulting in the 
future (e.g., Baker et al., 2016), economic expectations should foresee a positive relation 
between PU and future defaults. In addition, to the extent that more loan loss provisions in times 
of higher PU reflect economic expectations about future loan losses, we predict a stronger 
positive relation between PU and future defaults for banks that make more loan loss provisions. 
Using loan charge-offs to measure actual defaults, we find that PU is positively associated with 
loan charge-offs in the next quarter as well as with the accumulated charge-offs in the next four 
quarters, corroborating its depressive effects. More importantly, we find that the positive relation 
between PU and future charge-offs is significantly stronger for banks that accrue more losses in 
the current quarter, corroborating banks’ economic expectations. In an additional analysis of the 
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economic expectations conjecture, we also examine whether future liquidity creation is cut more 
significantly for banks that make more loan loss provisions in times of high PU. We find results 
consistent with our conjecture. 
Our study makes two contributions to the literature. First, as noted earlier, recent 
literature has viewed PU as an increasingly common macroeconomic phenomenon, with 
important implications for the economy, firms and individuals (Baker et al., 2014). While earlier 
studies on PU focus more on its economic implications, more recent research examines corporate 
decisions. For example, Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016) and Kim and Kung (2017) find that 
firms reduce investment under a higher level of uncertainty. Nguyen and Phan (2017) find that 
policy uncertainty is negatively related to firm acquisitiveness and positively related to the time 
it takes to complete M&A deals. Our paper complements and contrasts with the recent research 
on the information-related outcomes of PU. For example, Nagar, Schoenfeld and Wellman (2017) 
find that PU exacerbates information asymmetry among investors and increases voluntary 
disclosure. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to examine how PU impacts banks’ 
reporting of their expected loan losses and how such reporting is related to the riskiness of its 
existing loan portfolio and the extent of past loan loss reserves. We also demonstrate that such 
banks’ anticipation of greater loan losses in times of higher PU materializes into future actual 
loan losses. Our findings suggest that at least some banks are following regulatory guidance in 
that their loan loss provisions take into account broader macroeconomic, and not simply 
historical loan-related, indicators. 
 Second, our paper contributes to the banking literature by linking liquidity creation to 
bank accounting and PU. Liquidity creation is undoubtedly an important role of the banking 
system (Berger and Bouwman, 2009). Prior studies have examined various factors that could 
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affect liquidity creation (e.g., Levine and Zervos, 1998; Beatty and Liao, 2011). Beatty and Liao 
(2011) is a closely related study that finds that reductions in lending during recessionary periods 
are smaller when banks have previously been more timely in recognizing loan losses. In contrast 
to and complementing Beatty and Liao (2011), we focus on anticipation of loan losses in times 
of PU and how such anticipation affects liquidity creation. First, we show that liquidity creation 
is negatively affected by higher PU after controlling for many other contemporaneous economic 
factors and that this finding is consistent with higher PU being a harbinger for more difficult 
times ahead. More importantly, we show that when banks anticipate higher loan losses, as 
reflected in higher loan loss provisions, they cut back even more on liquidity creation when there 
is higher PU. One implication of this finding is that the depressive effects of PU the prior 
literature documents (e.g., reduction in investment and employment) could be at least partly 
driven by banks’ cutting back on liquidity creation in anticipation of loan losses.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We begin by reviewing the relevant 
literature and introducing the background for our research, followed by our hypotheses 
development. Then we introduce the data and sample and design for the empirical tests, as well 
as discuss the results. Finally, the last section concludes. 
2. Background and hypotheses development 
Politicians and regulatory institutions frequently make decisions that alter the 
environment in which firms operate and companies routinely face a significant amount of 
uncertainty about the timing, content and potential impact of fiscal, regulatory and monetary 
policy decisions, which is referred to as policy uncertainty (PU) (Gulen and Ion, 2016). Due to 
growth in government spending, taxes and regulation and the increased political polarization 
induced by rising voter and media polarization and income inequality, PU in the US has 
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experienced a secular rise since the 1960s (Baker et al., 2014). The significantly increasing trend 
can be seen in the newspaper-based PU index, introduced in Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016), 
which corresponds to a dramatic rise in the frequency of discussion of policy uncertainty in the 
Federal Reserve’s Beige Book, released starting from the 1980s.  
The banking industry is sensitive to economic policies, including the uncertainty 
underlying them, because these policies could affect ability and willingness of banks to lend and 
borrowers to repay their loans.3 To improve the accuracy of loan loss estimation, the SEC and 
bank regulators recommend that bank managers take a series of macro factors into consideration, 
including economic growth and the business cycle. For example, the FFIEC (1993) stated that 
“Although historical loss experience provides a reasonable starting point for the institution’s 
analysis, historical losses, or even recent trends in losses are not, by themselves, a sufficient 
basis to determine the appropriate level for the ALLL [allowance for loan and lease losses]. 
Management should also consider any factors…, including but not limited to…changes in 
national and local economic and business conditions….” The SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 
(Release No. SAB 102) similarly recommends that registrants should consider the impact of 
current environmental factors when estimating loan losses (SEC, 2001).   
In principle, loan loss provisions are made to communicate the underlying condition of a 
bank’s loan portfolios to stakeholders (AICPA, 1983). The depressive effect of policy 
uncertainty on the real economy is well-documented anecdotally and in recent empirical studies. 
Early theoretical work such as that by Bernanke (1983) demonstrates that uncertainty in general 
creates incentives for firms to delay investment and hiring by temporarily increasing the rewards 
of waiting for more information. Such predictions are in keeping with anecdotes about PU’s 
                                                          
3 For example, using Chinese commercial banks as a sample, Chi and Li (2017) document a positive relation 
between policy uncertainty and banks’ credit risks. 
9 
 
depressive effects that appear in the popular press. For example, on May 16, 2017, Reuters 
quoted Chris Griffith, CEO of Angle American Platinum, as saying, “Uncertainty is dreadful for 
investment. It puts pressure on jobs and some mines that are already loss-making … there will be 
further rationalization of the mines and it’s going to lead to further job losses …”.4 Using a 
newly developed measure of PU, Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016) provide empirical evidence at 
the macro and firm levels that policy uncertainty has a negative impact on investment and 
employment. Given that uncertainty reduces GDP growth (Bloom et al., 2012; Baker and Bloom, 
2013), firm production (Bachmann, Elstener and Sims, 2013) and productivity (Bloom, 2009), 
firms are more likely to default when PU is higher. The high unemployment rate resulting from 
high PU can also increase uncertainty for household income. Similarly, recent research in 
corporate finance also highlights the depressive effect of policy uncertainty. For example, 
Bonaime et al. (2018) find that policy uncertainty is strongly negatively associated with M&A 
activity at the macro and firm levels. Gulen and Ion (2016) report that policy uncertainty 
constrains capital expenditures and Starks and Sun (2016) find that it affects mutual funds’ 
investment decisions.  
To the extent that banks expect the depressive effects of PU on their borrowers to result 
in more future loan losses, banks should accrue more loan loss provisions when PU is high. 
Moreover, prior literature suggests that higher loan loss provisions can signal banks’ financial 
strength and that being more proactive in recognizing loan losses can have positive consequences 
such as enabling banks to better weather capital crunches and reducing excessive risk-taking 
(Beatty and Liao, 2014). For example, Beaver et al. (1989) find that higher loan loss allowances 
are associated with higher market values, consistent with markets perceiving a bank’s earnings 
                                                          
4  The news article can be found online: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-platinum-week-anglo-platinum/more-
south-african-mining-jobs-at-stake-on-policy-uncertainty-amplats-ceo-idUSKCN18C1YA. 
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power to be strong enough to withstand a “hit to earnings” from a higher level of loan loss 
provisions. Hence, from the perspective of accounting for the depressive effects of PU, one 
might expect greater loan loss provisions in higher PU periods. 
However, while one might believe that accruals should be based on economic 
expectations, researchers in accounting and finance have recognized for years that banks also use 
latitude in accounting rules to opportunistically manage loan loss provisions, especially when 
there are incentives to do so (see survey by Beatty and Liao, 2014). We argue the 
macroeconomic conditions can give rise to incentives to manipulate loan loss provisions, 
especially when loan loss provisions directly affect earnings and regulatory capital, two 
important indicators of the safe and soundness of banks.5 In particular, to the extent that higher 
PU generates more difficult economic conditions (e.g., less demand for loans, more loan losses, 
greater scarcity of capital and downward pressure on regulatory capital), we expect banks to face 
more competition, regulatory scrutiny for safe and soundness and even survival concerns. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, banks, and firms more generally, typically have incentives to hide bad 
news in the face of such adverse conditions (e.g., Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Beatty, Ke and 
Petroni, 2002; Cohen et al., 2014). Anecdotal evidence also supports this argument. For example, 
the recent financial crisis provoked significant public concern and consensus that loan loss 
provisions and allowances prior to the crisis were inadequate to cover the credit losses incurred 
by banks (Financial Accounting Standards Board [FASB], 2012).  
Two pieces of evidence from prior literature support the view that adverse economic 
conditions can lead to an opportunistic reduction in loan loss provisions. First, prior studies 
document a negative association between loan loss provisions and capital ratios, suggesting that 
                                                          
5 For example, in evaluating the safe and soundness of an institution, bank regulators follow the CAMELS system: 
Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity and Sensitivity (to systemic risk). 
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banks use loan loss provisions to reduce the expected regulatory costs associated with violating 
capital requirements (Moyer, 1990; Beatty et al., 1995; Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas, 1999). 
Second, prior literature finds a positive association between loan loss provisions and earnings 
before loan loss provisions, suggesting that banks discretionarily manage earnings upwards 
(downwards) when true earnings are low (high) (e.g., Collins et al., 1995; Beatty et al., 2002). 
 In addition, theory suggests that uncertainty may make it easier for managers to conceal 
reporting bias (Dye, 1988; Jung and Kwon 1988; Fischer and Verrecchia, 2000). For example, 
banks can claim that policy uncertainty makes it harder to determine whether loan losses are 
probable. This, in turn, justifies a delay in the recognition of loan losses until there is greater 
certainty about a policy and its implications. Hence, to the extent that higher PU creates 
incentives for banks to manage earnings and/or regulatory capital upwards to hide bad news, one 
might expect banks to record lower loan loss provisions during such periods.6 
In short, the arguments and evidence in the prior literature suggest that there could be a 
positive or negative association between PU and loan loss provisions. Nevertheless, we predict 
that on balance, banks tend to record more loan loss provisions during higher PU periods. A key 
reason is that PU is a macroeconomic effect observable by various stakeholders, including 
auditors and investors, and thus could constrain opportunism in reporting loan loss provisions. 
Specifically, to the extent that higher PU results in stakeholders expecting more difficult times 
ahead, it would be harder for banks to justify lower loan loss provisions at such times. Hence, 
our first hypothesis, stated in alternative form, is: 
H1. Banks make more loan loss provisions in times of higher PU. 
                                                          
6 We might also find no relation between loan loss provisions and PU because the accounting standards do not 
explicitly require banks to record higher loan loss provisions when there is higher uncertainty, whether it be 
economic policy uncertainty or another type. In fact, standard setters have made a recent push towards more 
forward-looking provisioning for losses, as evidenced by the introduction of a new accounting standard, FASB ASU 
No. 2016-13, which will be mandatory for the fiscal year beginning after Dec. 15, 2019. 
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Taking into account banks’ key operating characteristics, we next derive several auxiliary 
hypotheses to shed light on the channel through which policy uncertainty affects loan loss 
provisions. As we argue above, PU could adversely affect borrowers’ prospects, thus increasing 
bank managers’ expectation of future loan defaults. Banks with more risky portfolios typically 
expose themselves to more loan losses when economic conditions worsen. For example, during 
the recent financial crisis, higher risk exposure in loan portfolios was associated with a poorer 
performance and a higher probability of insolvency and bank failure (Campbell, 2007; Knaup 
and Wagner, 2012; Ng and Roychowdhury, 2014). In other words, given that banks’ loan 
portfolio risk reflects the extent of their vulnerability to borrowers’ defaults, when PU rises, the 
magnitude of the incremental credit losses a bank will suffer depends on its loan portfolio risk. 
Hence, banks with higher risk should expect more incremental loan losses and make even more 
loan loss provisions when PU is higher. Accordingly, we state this hypothesis as follows: 
H2. The association between loan loss provisions and PU will be greater for riskier banks. 
Banks with more timely loan loss recognition should be better prepared for economic 
shocks. In practice, loan loss provisions for a specific accounting period are typically not directly 
estimated and two steps are usually taken to arrive at an estimated number. In the first, bank 
managers estimate the total losses for all outstanding loans at each period end and present this 
number as the loan loss allowance in the balance sheet. Then current-period loan loss provisions 
are calculated as the increase in the allowance compared to the prior period end and adjusted by 
net write-offs. Thus, the estimated amount of loan loss provisions depends on how much of the 
total credit losses have been accrued into the allowance in previous periods. In general, banks 
will accrue less loan loss into the pool of allowance if they have already accrued more loan 
losses in previous periods. Hence, when PU increases, the increase in loan loss allowance, which 
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will be recognized as current-period loan loss provisions, should be smaller for banks that have 
already accrued a greater allowance in previous periods. We state this hypothesis as follows: 
H3. The association between loan loss provisions and PU will be lower for banks with more 
prior loan loss reserves. 
To further substantiate our economic-based explanation for the relation between PU and 
loan loss provisions, in the following hypothesis we shift our focus from loan loss expectation to 
realization. Based on our earlier discussion, we posit that, on balance, the contemporaneous 
relation between PU and loan loss provisions is positive because bank managers expect more 
future loan defaults when PU is high given its expected depressive effects on the real economy at 
both the macro and micro levels (e.g., Bloom, 2009; Bloom et al., 2012; Baker and Bloom, 2013; 
Bachmann, Elstener and Sims, 2013; Baker, Bloom and Davis, 2016). In terms of the actual 
realization of loan outcomes (as opposed to the accruals related to the expectation of loan 
outcomes), higher PU is expected to lead to more future loan defaults and thus more loan charge-
offs by banks. Figure 1 depicts the relationship between loan loss provisions, loan loss allowance 
and loan charge-offs. By definition, loan loss provisions reflect managers’ estimation of future 
loan loss realization, which will be recorded as loan charge-offs when the loan actually becomes 
uncollectible.  
Given the link between loan loss provisions and charge-offs, if managers rationally take 
into account the economic consequences of PU and use loan loss provisions as a signal of 
expected loan conditions (e.g., Scholes et al., 1990; Wahlen, 1994; Beaver and Engel, 1996; Liu 
et al., 1997; Kanagaretnam et al., 2004, 2005), then we would expect more future charge-offs for 
banks that make more loan loss provisions in the current period. However, it is possible that the 
relation between PU and loan loss provision merely reflects bank managers’ behavioral biases 
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related to policy uncertainty. Under this alternative view, the sensitivity of loan loss provisions 
with respect to PU manifests from behavioral bias rather than from the future economic 
conditions that bank managers expect. For example, Hribar et al. (2017) find that managerial 
sentiment is negatively associated with loan loss provisions in the banking industry and that 
evidence from future loan charge-offs suggests that loan loss provisions result from the 
behavioral biases of under- (over-) provisioning in periods of high (low) managerial sentiment. 
In the case of behavioral bias as the explanation, one might anticipate that higher loan loss 
provisions in response to higher PU will be associated with smaller charge-offs in the future. 
However, since we predict that higher loan loss provisions in times of higher PU reflect the 
rational expectations of banks, we state this hypothesis as follows: 
H4. The positive association between PU and future loan charge-offs will be greater for banks 
that make more loan loss provisions. 
 Banks play the important role of providing liquidity to the economy though their direct 
and indirect lending activities (Berger and Bouwman, 2009). Liquidity creation is a key function 
of banks, accomplished using deposits and other sources of capital to engage in lending, loan 
commitments and other off-balance-sheet guarantees. Bank liquidity creation has numerous 
positive economic effects, including delivering credit to informationally opaque borrowers 
without capital market opportunities (Levine and Zervos, 1998), providing depositors with liquid 
funds and payment services that are essential to a functioning economy (Kashyap, Rajan and 
Stein, 2002) and supplying loan commitments and derivatives like interest rate swaps that allow 
customers to plan their investments and hedge their financial risks (Boot, Greenbaum and Thakor, 
1993). Bank liquidity creation has a stronger effect on economic growth than do other measures 
of bank output (Berger and Sedunov, 2017). Bank liquidity creation could also have a dark side 
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for the economy – excessive bank liquidity creation is associated with an elevated probability of 
an impending financial crisis (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012; Berger and Bouwman, 2017). 
To the extent that higher PU is a harbinger of deteriorating economic conditions, one 
would expect the equilibrium amount of liquidity creation in the economy to be lower due to a 
lower demand for and supply of credit. In other words, one would expect a negative association 
between PU and future liquidity creation. From the supply perspective, to the extent that current 
loan loss provisions reflect a bank’s expectation of future economic conditions, one should 
expect a bank that makes greater loan loss provisions to cut back on credit supply even more 
because of its expectation of worse economic conditions. Another reason for this expectation is 
that loan loss provisions, while not affecting the amount of cash the bank has, reduce the amount 
of regulatory (tier 1) capital.7 A reduction in regulatory capital, in turn, can constrain the bank’s 
ability to lend. Hence, our final hypothesis is:   
H5. The negative association between PU and future liquidity creation will be greater for banks 
that make more loan loss provisions. 
3. Sample, model, variables, and descriptive statistics 
3.1 Sample 
Our sample includes all US commercial banks and the bank-level data are extracted from 
Call Reports filed with bank regulators.8 We obtain PU data from Baker, Bloom and Davis’ 
(2016) website. Since policy uncertainty is a macro-level variable with only time-series variation, 
we use quarterly instead of annual data to increase sample size and, by extension, the power of 
                                                          
7 It is important to note that loan loss provisioning is essentially an accrual process. When a bank accrues for more 
anticipated losses, there is no direct impact on the amount of cash/capital the bank has. 
8  Data for all US commercial banks are publicly available online at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago: 
https://www.chicagofed.org/banking/financial-institution-reports/commercial-bank-data; we alternatively use the 
bank holding companies sample obtained from the Compustat Bank database and get empirical results that are 
qualitatively the same (untabulated). 
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our tests.9 Other macro-level control variables are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis and the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Even though by 1992 the US had fully implemented the Basel Capital Accord (BASEL), 
which introduced a new capital adequacy framework, the risk-based capital and risk-weighted 
assets required to calculate the risk-based capital ratio (an important control variable) have only 
been available in the Call Reports database since the first quarter of 1996. 10 Therefore, our final 
sample consists of all bank-quarter observations with necessary data for constructing our model 
variables for the period from 1996:2 to 2016:4. 11 
3.2 Model and variables 
Our first hypothesis, H1, suggests that on balance, the association between PU and loan 
loss provisions is positive mainly because PU’s expected depressive effects on borrowers 
increase bank managers’ assessment of future loan losses. To test this central hypothesis, we 
estimate the following pooled OLS equation: 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3Δ𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝛽𝛽4Δ𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1+ 𝛽𝛽5Δ𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6Δ𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽8Δ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽9𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽10𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ 𝛽𝛽11𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶1𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽12𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽13𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1+ 𝛽𝛽14𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  + 𝛽𝛽15𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽16𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ 𝛽𝛽17𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽18𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽19𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑏𝑏 𝑓𝑓𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒+ 𝜀𝜀,                                                                                            (1) 
                                                          
9 Since quarterly data are available for all US banks, most banking research uses bank-quarter observations, e.g., 
Beatty and Liao (2011), Bushman and Williams (2012, 2015) and Goetz et al. (2016). 
10 Alternatively, we follow Beck and Narayanamoorthy (2013) to start our sample period with 1992 (when BASEL 
took effect) and construct a capital ratio proxy as percentage of total equity to total assets. We get qualitatively 
similar results. 
11 The final sample period starts with the second quarter of 1996 because we have to control for the lagged risk-
based capital ratio in our baseline model. 
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where LLPi,t is the loan loss provision in quarter t scaled by the lagged total loans of bank i and 
PU Indext is the natural log of quarter t’s overall PU index introduced in Baker, Bloom and 
Davis (2016). Our interest in Equation (1) centers on β1. According to our central hypothesis, if 
policy uncertainty affects loan loss provisions, then when uncertainty is higher (lower), we 
expect the estimated provisions to be higher (lower) such that β1 should be positive because the 
expected depressive effects of policy uncertainty increase bank managers’ expectation of future 
loan losses. 
Our interest is the effect of policy-related, rather than economy-wide, uncertainty. 
However, the BBD policy uncertainty index we use as our variable of interest is likely to be 
correlated with the general economic uncertainty. Hence, it is crucial for us to deal with 
economy-wide uncertainty as a possible omitted variable problem. Following Bonaime, Gulen 
and Ion (2018), we control for general macroeconomic uncertainty (MacroUncertaintyt) in the 
model to avoid this problem. MacroUncertaintyt is defined as the principal component of the 
following four variables that capture macro-level economic uncertainty: (1) Jurado et al.’s (2015) 
uncertainty index, developed as the unforecastable component in a system of 279 
macroeconomic variables; (2) the Chicago Board Options Exchange’s VXO index of implied 
volatility; (3) the cross-sectional standard deviation of cumulative returns during the quarter 
using the entire CRSP universe and (4) the cross-sectional standard deviation of year-on-year 
sales growth using the entire Compustat quarterly universe. 
Following prior literature (e.g., Liu and Ryan, 2006; Beatty and Liao, 2011, 2014; 
Bushman and Williams, 2012; Hribar et al., 2017), we also control for a series of bank-level 
characteristics in the above baseline model. First, we include ∆NPLi,t-1 and ∆NPLi,t-2 because loan 
loss estimation is usually based on the historical trend of nonperforming loans, i.e., the 
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accounting rule currently in effect for credit losses is backward looking. However, prior 
literature also suggests that to some extent, some banks are forward looking when making loan 
loss provisions. Therefore, we also include ∆NPLi,t and ∆NPLi,t+1 in the model in case current 
and future quarter information about nonperforming loans is used in the estimation process. 
Secondly, because banks of different sizes typically face different levels of regulatory scrutiny 
and firm size is a common control in the accounting and finance literature, we control for lagged 
bank size (SIZEi,t-1). We also control for loan growth rate (∆LOANi,t) because credit risk will 
deteriorate if banks increase lending by extending credit to less financially healthy clients. 
Earnings before loan loss provisions (EBPi,t) and the lagged tier 1 risk-based capital ratio 
(CAPR1i,t-1) are added to control for potential incentives for earning smoothing and/or capital 
management through loan loss provisions. We also control for net charge-offs (COt) and lagged 
loan loss allowance (ALWi,t-1) because of the inherent relationship between loan loss provisions, 
allowance and charge-offs. Specifically, banks could accrue a smaller provision during the 
current quarter if they have already recorded a sufficient allowance in previous quarters. 
Similarly, charge-offs will reduce the allowance level, thereby potentially affecting loan loss 
provisions. We scale those bank-level control variables by lagged total outstanding loans. In 
addition, we control for earnings volatility (EARNINGVOLi,t-1), the percentage of homogeneous 
loans (HOMOGENEITYi,t), bank listing status (PUBLICi,t) and internal control requirements 
(INTCONTROLi,t) because they are potentially important determinants of loan loss provisions.  
In addition to bank-level controls, we also control for several macro-level conditions, 
including GDP growth (GDPGRWt), unemployment rate growth (UNEMPGRWt) and the return 
on the S&P/Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index (CSRETt), because prior studies suggest 
that these factors can also influence loan loss provisions (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 
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1998; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2006; Louzis et al., 2012; Bushman and Williams, 2012; Beck and 
Narayanamoorthy, 2013). Moreover, these macro-level variables may also affect the level of 
policy uncertainty. We define the variables mentioned above in Appendix A and winsorize all 
continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Finally, we include bank fixed effects to 
mitigate the omitted variable problem due to time-invariant factors.12 In the regression analysis, 
we always adjust standard errors for bank and quarter two-way clustering (Petersen, 2009; Gow, 
Ormazabal and Taylor, 2010). 
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1, Panel A reports summary statistics for the regression variables over the whole 
sample period. The full sample consists of 634,059 bank-quarter observations from 12,885 
unique US commercial banks. We find that LLPi,t has a mean of 0.001, suggesting that loan loss 
provisions are 0.1%, on average, of lagged total loans. Since loan loss provisions are meant to 
estimate future charge-offs, we observe that the distributional statistics for charge-offs are very 
close to those for loan loss provisions. Panel B presents the Pearson correlations for these 
regression variables. The results show that loan loss provisions (LLPi,t) and the overall PU index 
(PU Indext) are positively correlated, consistent with our central hypothesis. We also find that 
LLPi,t is positively correlated with the changes in nonperforming loans (ΔNPL), net charge-offs 
(COi,t), earnings volatility (EARNINGVOLi,t-1) and the internal control requirement 
(INTCONTROLi,t) while negatively correlated with lagged tier 1 capital ratio (CAPR1i,t-1) and the 
proportion of homogeneous loans (HOMOGENEITYi,t). In addition, as expected, the four macro-
level control variables, i.e., macroeconomic uncertainty (MarcroUncertaintyt), GDP growth 
                                                          
12 Since the measure of PU is a macro-level variable with only time-series variation, the regression model cannot 
include quarter fixed effects. 
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(GDPGRWt), unemployment rate growth (UNEMPGRWt) and return on the national home price 
index (CSRETt), are significantly correlated with PU Indext.  
Figure 2 plots the BBD (2016) PU index with the aggregate level of loan loss provisions 
measured at the quarterly median value. The figure indicates that when PU increases (decreases), 
the aggregate level of loan loss provisions also increases (decreases). This visual pattern lends 
initial support to our hypothesis that the relation between PU and loan loss provisions is positive. 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Main findings 
Table 2 presents the results of testing H1 via the estimation of Equation (1). In the 
baseline model, we regress loan loss provisions (LLPi,t) on the PU index (PU Indext) and other 
control variables. In Table 2 (and the remaining tables), we include bank fixed effects and report 
t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by bank and quarter.  
We start our baseline analysis with each component of PU and then move on to the 
overall PU index. The BBD (2016) overall PU index is a weighted average index consisting of 
four components: i) an PU index constructed by a newspaper-based approach, based on 10 
leading US newspapers; ii) uncertainty related to tax code expirations; iii) disagreement over CPI 
forecasts and iv) disagreement over government purchases forecasts. To investigate the effect of 
each component while avoiding the possible collinearity problem, we run the baseline model 
with each component separately. As shown in the first four columns of Table 2, the results for 
each component are consistent with our prediction, i.e., the coefficients on all the PU 
components are significantly positive.13  
                                                          
13 In addition to the newspaper-based index using the 10 leading US newspapers, Baker et al. (2016) provide an 
alternative policy uncertainty measure that is derived from the Access World News database, which includes over 
2,000 US newspapers. We find similar results when using this alternative measure of policy uncertainty. 
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The results in column (5) also show a positive relation between the overall PU Indext and 
LLPi,t. More specifically, the coefficient on PU Indext is 0.0473 and is significantly different 
from zero at the 1% level. As expected, banks’ loan loss provisions are positively associated with 
macroeconomic uncertainty (MacroUncertaintyt). Since we control for this general economic 
uncertainty, the coefficient on our variable of interest (PU Indext) captures the effect due to 
policy-related uncertainty. The signs of the estimated coefficients for the bank-level control 
variables are generally consistent with the findings in prior literature. For instance, the changes 
in nonperforming loans (ΔNPL) in the past, current and near future are positively associated with 
the loan loss provisions accrued in the current period (LLPi,t) and the change in outstanding loans 
(ΔLOANi,t) and net charge-offs (COi,t) in the current quarter also have positive effects. 
Meanwhile operating performance (EBPi,t) and loan loss allowance at the beginning of the 
quarter (ALWi,t-1) are negatively associated with LLPi,t.14  
The main results we document above are not only statistically but also economically 
significant. To show the economic significance of the effect of policy uncertainty on loan loss 
provisions, we calculate the effect of a one standard deviation change in the overall PU Indext. 
Based on the estimated coefficient on the overall PU Indext and the distribution of PU Indext and 
LLPi,t, we find that a one standard deviation increase in policy uncertainty is associated with a 
11.42% increase in loan loss provisions.15 This magnitude is larger than the effect of future 
changes in nonperforming loans (ΔNPLi,t+1), a previously documented provisions determinant 
indicating that some bank managers are forward looking (Beatty and Liao, 2011).  
                                                          
14 While the significantly negative coefficient on EBPi,t is inconsistent with earlier studies such as Beatty et al. 
(1995), Collins et al. (1995) and Liu and Ryan (2006), it is consistent with recent studies such as Beatty and Liao 
(2011) and Hribar et al. (2017). 
15 The reported percentage is calculated as (regression coefficient × standard deviation of PU Indext ) / mean value 
of LLPi,t.  
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Hribar et al. (2017) document that managerial sentiment biases bank managers’ accrual 
estimates. Both the sentiment measure and the PU index are macro-level variables with only 
time-series variation and both are shown to be correlated with several other macro-level 
variables, such as GDP growth and the change in the unemployment rate. In the last two columns 
of Table 2, we further control for managerial sentiment. As a first step, we replicate Hribar et 
al.’s (2017) results in column (6). Consistent with their main findings, the coefficient on 
managerial sentiment (BELIEFSt) is significantly negative. Next, we rerun the baseline model 
with additional controls for managerial sentiment and present the results in column (7). We 
continue to find a significantly positive coefficient on PU Indext after controlling for managerial 
sentiment. 16  However, the coefficient on BELIEFSt becomes insignificant. This result is 
important because it suggests that rational expectations about the depressive effects of policy 
uncertainty, not managerial sentiments, drive loan loss provisioning. 
Overall, the results in Table 2 are consistent with our prediction in H1. We show a 
positive and significant contemporaneous relation between loan loss provisions and PU, after 
controlling for various bank-level characteristics as well as several macro-level control variables. 
Our finding indicates that bank managers are concerned about PU’s expected depressive effects 
and incorporate their expectation into accrual estimates. This finding is also consistent with prior 
literature that documents the use of loan loss provisions to communicate private information 
about future loan losses.17 
4.2. Robustness tests 
                                                          
16 The managerial sentiment measure is derived from the Duke University/CFO Magazine Business Outlook survey, 
which is only available after 2002. We do not control for managerial sentiment in our main specification because 
doing so would significantly shorten our sample period. 
17 In the latter part of this paper, we provide more evidence using future loan charge-offs and liquidity creation to 
support the notion that managers do indeed communicate their expectations. 
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We conduct several additional tests to check the robustness of our main findings. First, to 
further address the possibility of omitted variable bias in the baseline model and as a means of 
establishing causality, following Gulen and Ion (2016) and Bonaime et al. (2018), we use an 
instrumental variable for PU. Specifically, we employ the partisan-conflict index of Azzimonti 
(2016) from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, which is based on a frequency count of 
newspaper articles containing terms related to lawmakers’ policy disagreements. By construction, 
partisan conflict should have an impact on policy uncertainty and arguably no direct effect on 
banks’ loan loss provisions. In the first stage, we regress the PU index on the partisan-conflict 
index and the bank- and macro-level controls used in our main specification. In the second stage, 
we run the same OLS regression as specified in Equation (1), but with the fitted values from the 
first stage regressions as the instrumented PU. 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 present the results of the 2SLS estimation. In the first 
stage, the coefficient on the instrumental variable is significantly positive and the F-statistics 
suggest that the instrument satisfies the relevance condition. In the second stage, we continue to 
find a positive relation between the instrumented PU and loan loss provisions and the magnitude 
of the regression coefficient is comparable with that of the baseline results using the overall PU 
index as shown in column (5) of Table 2. Therefore, our primary results are robust to an IV 
approach to mitigate omitted variable bias. 
In addition, we test whether our baseline results are sensitive to the exclusion of 
observations from periods of economic difficulties for two reasons. First, PU tends to be higher 
during these periods and governments try to develop policies to try to revive the economy. As 
there is often significant uncertainty about their adoption and their effectiveness, there could be a 
concern that economic difficulties, as opposed to PU, drive loan loss provisioning. Second, 
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banks could be under unique circumstances (e.g., governmental intervention in the banking 
system and bank closures) during periods of economic difficulty and only make additional loan 
loss provisions as a consequence of these unique circumstances. For example, during the last 
financial crisis in the United States, the Troubled Asset Relief Program, whose stated objective 
was to provide financial stability, was also viewed by many as a government bailout of troubled 
banks.  
To ensure that banks are indeed making more loan loss provisions because they anticipate 
more future loan losses when PU is higher, we rerun our baseline model after removing bank-
quarter observations during recession periods, as defined by NBER, i.e., observations during the 
2nd to 4th quarters of 2001 and from the 4th quarter of 2007 to the 2nd quarter of 2009. The results 
in column (3) of Table 3 are qualitatively similar to those reported in column (5) of Table 2 and 
thus confirm that our main results are robust to the exclusion of the recession period observations. 
Alternatively, we rerun our baseline model after removing all bank-quarter observations 
in the whole period during which lenders and borrowers can be potentially affected by the recent 
financial crisis, i.e., from the 1st quarter of 2007 to the 4th quarter of 2010. Column (4) of Table 3 
presents the regression results. The coefficient on PU index is significantly positive and the 
magnitude of the coefficient is comparable with that reported in our main regressions, suggesting 
that our main findings are not driven by economic difficulties induced by financial crisis. 
Taking together, the robustness checks in Table 3 show that our main findings are robust 
to different specifications and different sample periods.  
5. Cross-sectional tests 
In this section, we first introduce two cross-sectional analyses to examine our additional 
hypotheses on the conditions under which the relation between PU and loan loss provisions is 
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stronger or weaker. The objective of these analyses is to provide deeper insight into our baseline 
results and to shed light on the channel through which policy uncertainty affects loan loss 
provisions. To test those cross-sectional hypotheses, we include in Equation (1) an interaction 
term between policy uncertainty and each measure of bank risk or sufficiency of prior loan loss 
reserves. Our focus is on the coefficients of those interaction terms. 
5.1 The role of bank risk  
In H2, we investigate whether the relation between PU and loan loss provisions varies for 
banks with different levels of risk. We focus on loan portfolio and regulatory-capital-related risk 
because those are the most important types of risk for banks. We argue that loan portfolio risk, to 
some extent, reflects lenders’ risk management as well as borrowers’ financial health and thus 
the ability to deal with the depressive effects of policy uncertainty. Therefore, we posit that 
banks with higher loan portfolio risk are more heavily affected by PU. To test this hypothesis, we 
start with two distinct proxies that capture different aspects of loan portfolio risk, i.e., i) the 
percentage of nonperforming loans and ii) loan type diversification. 
Disclosure of nonperforming assets is an informative and useful aid in analyzing banks’ 
asset quality (Meeker and Gray, 1987; Beaver et al., 1989), hence we use the percentage of 
nonperforming loans as our first proxy for loan portfolio risk. Specifically, we define this 
variable, NPLt-1, as the last quarter’s nonperforming loans scaled by total outstanding loans. To 
ease the interpretation of the coefficient on the interaction term, we create a dummy variable, 
High, to differentiate between banks with higher vs. lower loan portfolio risk. High equals 1 if a 
bank-quarter observation has a value of NPLi,t-1 that is greater than the median value, otherwise 0. 
By construction, observations with a higher percentage of nonperforming loans (High = 1) will 
have higher loan portfolio risk.  
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The extent to which PU adversely affects the economy can be different for different 
regions or types of borrowers. Therefore, the credit risks of the outstanding loans allocated to 
different types of borrowers are probably not perfectly correlated with each other and hence are 
at least partially diversifiable. Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) document an improvement in bank 
lending after US banking regulators relaxed restrictions on intrastate branching, which impeded 
geographic diversification. Conversely, customer concentration increases industrial companies’ 
risk and cost of capital (Dhaliwal et al., 2016; Campello and Gao, 2017), while loan type 
concentration increases the probability of bank failure (Ng and Roychowdhury, 2014). Multi-
market banks smooth local exogenous shocks by reallocating their credit supply between 
affected and unaffected markets (Cortés and Strahan, 2017).18 Thus, we consider the extent of 
loan type diversification as our second proxy of loan portfolio risk. Specifically, we define loan 
type diversification as one minus the Herfindahl index of the distribution of real estate loans, 
commercial and industrial loans; loans to depository institutions; agricultural loans; loans to 
individuals and loans to foreign governments. Based on the lagged loan type diversification 
measure (LDIVi,t-1), the dummy variable High is coded as 1 if the bank-quarter observation has a 
value of LDIVi,t-1 that is greater than the median value, otherwise 0. Banks with a larger value of 
LDIVi,t-1 are more diversified (High = 1), in the sense that the outstanding loans are more evenly 
distributed across different categories of borrowers.  
Besides the loan portfolio risk, we consider the regulatory-capital-related risk since the 
banking industry is heavily regulated and minimum regulatory capital is the most important 
requirement. Capital adequacy is a key element of the safe and soundness of banks and one that 
bank regulators have long emphasized (Burhouse et al., 2003). Since bank regulators impose 
                                                          
18 When PU rises, more diversified banks not only have a lower ex-ante credit risk but also enjoy more ex-post 
flexibility in lending reallocation. 
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only a minimum capital ratio, bank managers have discretion with regard to maintaining capital 
ratios well above the minimum requirement. Therefore, the actual capital ratio level is 
endogenously determined by bank managers. Consistent with the view that higher capital 
adequacy reflects more prudence or less excessive risk-taking, recent empirical studies show that 
banks with a higher capital ratio are less likely to fail or to receive enforcement letters (Ng and 
Roychowdhury, 2014; Akins et al., 2016) and they enjoy a lower funding cost and are less risky 
(Levine, Lin and Xie, 2016; Goetz, Laeven and Levine, 2016). To test our hypothesis from the 
perspective of regulatory-capital-related risk we use the tier 1 risk-based capital ratio defined in 
the Basel Capital Accord. The tier 1 capital ratio is calculated as core capital, including common 
equity, perpetual preferred stock, etc., divided by risk-weighted assets. The ratio is quarterly filed 
with bank regulators, as all banks need to meet the required minimum. Based on the lagged tier 1 
risk-based capital ratio (CAPR1i,t-1), the dummy variable High is coded as 1 if a bank-quarter 
observation has a value that is greater than the quarterly median, otherwise 0. 
Table 4 presents the results of these cross-sectional tests. Consistent with our prediction 
in H2, the coefficients on PU Indext ×High are statistically significant and have the expected 
signs. Column (1) shows the results of using the percentage of nonperforming loans as our first 
measure of loan portfolio risk: the coefficient on PU Indext is 0.0261 and the coefficient on PU 
Indext ×High is 0.0494, both positive and significant at the 1% level. Therefore, the effect of 
policy uncertainty on loan loss provision is much larger for banks with higher nonperforming 
loans: the total magnitude equals to 0.0756 (i.e., 0.0261 plus 0.0494×1), compared to that of 
banks with lower nonperforming loans, 0.0261 (i.e., 0.0261 plus 0.0494×0). Column (2) 
presents the results using loan type diversification as our second measure of loan portfolio risk 
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and the results are consistent with our second hypothesis.19 As expected, the coefficient on the 
interaction term in column (3) is significantly negative since the higher tier 1 risk-based capital 
ratio represents a lower capital-related risk. Collectively, considering loan portfolio risk as well 
as regulatory-capital-related risk, we find corroborating evidence that supports our prediction 
that the positive effect of policy uncertainty on loan loss provisions is stronger for riskier banks. 
The moderating effects of loan portfolio and regulatory risk indicates that when making loan loss 
accrual estimates, bank managers take into account the bank’s own risk level. 
5.2 The role of prior reserves  
In H3, we exploit the variation in the sufficiency of prior loan loss reserves to investigate 
whether the effect of PU on loan loss provisions differs across banks. Since the sufficiency of 
prior loan loss reserves is close to the concept of timeliness in loan loss recognition, which is a 
specific kind of accounting conservatism shown to be beneficial to banks in terms of mitigating 
downside risk, we expect timelier banks that have accrued more losses into the allowance in the 
past will not need to record the same level of current-period loan loss provisions as do other 
banks. In short, we predict that the effect of policy uncertainty on loan loss provisions will be 
weaker for banks with more prior loan loss reserves. 
To test H3, we use two similar but distinct measurements of sufficiency in prior reserves. 
First, following Beatty and Liao (2011), we define the sufficiency as the ratio of the loan loss 
allowance divided by nonperforming loans, with both the numerator and denominator taking 
their values as of quarter t-1. This is a useful ratio that reflects a bank’s effectiveness in 
identifying specific impaired loans (Fitch Research, 2009). 20 Alternatively, we also use net loan 
                                                          
19  The coefficients on the interaction terms are significantly negative, as expected, because higher-level risk 
diversification indicates lower loan portfolio risk. 
20 However, this percentage only takes into account the past level of nonperforming loans. Akins et al. (2017) 
modify this measure to include the current changes in nonperforming loans, i.e., they compute the loan loss reserves 
29 
 
charge-offs as the scaler, because regulators and analysts use the ratio of the allowance for loan 
losses to net charge-offs to assess the adequacy of banks loan loss reserves (Liu and Ryan, 2006). 
Choosing nonperforming loans and charge-offs as alternative scalers involves trade-offs between 
relevance and reliability: while the amount of nonperforming loans is a more timely measure of 
loan losses because it takes time to confirm losses and then record them as charge-offs, the 
charge-offs provide a more reliable indicator of loan losses (Beck and Narayanamoorthy, 2013). 
To ease the interpretation of the coefficient on the interaction term, we create a dummy variable 
(High) based on each measurement. High equals 1 if the bank-quarter observation has a value 
that is greater than the median, otherwise 0. According to the argument that banks with more 
prior reserves are better prepared for policy uncertainty, a significant negative coefficient on the 
interaction term, PU Indext ×High, would support our hypothesis. 
Table 5 presents the results of testing hypothesis H3. Consistent with our prediction, we 
find that the coefficients on PU Indext ×High are significantly negative for both measurements. 
For instance, as shown in the first column, the effect of policy uncertainty on loan loss provision 
is much smaller for banks with more prior reserves: the net magnitude equals 0.0137 (i.e., 0.0619 
minus 0.0482×1), compared to that of banks with lower prior reserves, 0.0619 (i.e., 0.0619 
minus 0.0482×0). Using two different measures, we get consistent results to support our 
hypothesis. Our finding in this cross-sectional test sheds new light on the benefit of conservative 
accounting practice in mitigating the expected adverse effect of policy uncertainty. 
5.3 The impact on future charge-offs 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
at quarter t-1 as a percentage of the nonperforming loans at quarter t. We obtain qualitatively similar results using 
this modified measure. 
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Our baseline results suggest that bank managers take PU into account when estimating 
loan loss provisions. One natural further question is whether the contemporaneous association 
between PU and loan loss provisions is driven by the rational expectation of future borrowers’ 
defaults or whether it merely reflects behavioral bias. Although the above cross-sectional tests 
provide corroborating evidence that banks with more exposure are expected to be more heavily 
affected by PU, indicating that the effect of PU on loan loss provisions tends to be driven by 
rational expectations, we set forth to provide direct evidence on this question by examining the 
relation between PU and future realized loan losses, captured by loan charge-offs. 
In H4, we predict that the amount of realized future charge-offs following quarter t is 
increasing in the level of quarter t PU and that this positive relation is more pronounced for 
banks that make more loan loss provisions in the current quarter. We test this hypothesis by 
estimating the following pooled OLS model: 
𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3Δ𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝛽𝛽4Δ𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1+ 𝛽𝛽5Δ𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6Δ𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽8Δ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽9𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽10𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ 𝛽𝛽11𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶1𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽12𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽13𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1+ 𝛽𝛽14𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  + 𝛽𝛽15𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽16𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ 𝛽𝛽17𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽18𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽19𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑏𝑏 𝑓𝑓𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒+ 𝜀𝜀,                                                                                            (2) 
where COi,t+1 is the net charge-offs in the next quarter scaled by total outstanding loans and the 
net charge-off is calculated as the realized loan losses minus recoveries. Alternatively, we also 
consider the charge-offs in the following year, i.e., 4 calendar quarters, labeled as COi,t+1234. In 
Equation (2), our interest is whether and how the current-quarter PU is associated with net 
charge-offs in subsequent quarter(s). To test whether this prediction varies for banks accruing 
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different levels of loan loss provisions, we additionally include an interaction term in Equation 
(2). Specifically, we create a dummy variable (High) based on the current-quarter loan loss 
provisions. High is coded as 1 if the current-quarter loan loss provision (LLPi,t) is greater than the 
quarterly median value, otherwise 0. Then we interact the current-quarter PU with this dummy 
variable, i.e., PU Indext×High. A significantly positive coefficient on this interaction term 
would support our hypothesis. 
We start by considering the loan charge-offs in the next quarter, i.e., testing whether and 
how current-quarter policy uncertainty is associated with next-quarter realized loan losses. The 
first column of Table 6 presents the results of this test by estimating Equation (2). The positive 
coefficient on PU Indext reveals the predictability of the current policy uncertainty on future 
realized loan losses and provides direct evidence of the depressive effects of policy uncertainty. 
More importantly, by including an interaction term in the second column, we find that the effect 
of current-quarter policy uncertainty on next-quarter charge-offs is significantly larger for banks 
that accrued more current-quarter loan loss provisions, consistent with our prediction. The 
significantly positive coefficient on the interaction term, PU Indext×High, provides direct 
evidence that accruing more loan loss provisions in the current quarter with respect to the 
contemporaneous higher policy uncertainty is associated with higher future realized loan losses. 
Therefore, our empirical evidence indicates that the relation between PU and loan loss provisions 
are likely to reflect bank managers’ rational expectation of future loan loss realization and cannot 
merely be explained by behavioral bias. 
To provide robust evidence for this hypothesis and because loan loss realization may take 
a longer time frame, we consider loan charge-offs in the following 4 quarters, i.e., one calendar 
year in the future. The last two columns of Table 6 present the results. We find that changing the 
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dependent variable to capture loan loss realization in a longer future period does not change our 
inferences. Collectively, the results in Table 6 provide direct and robust evidence suggesting that 
the positive relation between PU and loan loss provisions is mainly driven by bank managers’ 
rational expectation of future loan loss realization. 
5.4 The impact of PU on future liquidity creation 
Finally, we examine H5, which is about the real, as opposed to the accounting, effect of 
policy uncertainty in terms of banks’ liquidity creation. Specifically, from a real effect 
perspective, we investigate the relation between PU and banks’ future liquidity creation. We then 
investigate whether accounting, in the form of loan loss provisioning, plays a role in this relation. 
To conduct the analyses, we estimate the following pooled OLS model: 
Δ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3Δ𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝛽𝛽4Δ𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1+ 𝛽𝛽5Δ𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6Δ𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ 𝛽𝛽10𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶1𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽11𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽12𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1+ 𝛽𝛽13𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  + 𝛽𝛽14𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽15𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ 𝛽𝛽16𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽17𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽18𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 + 𝑏𝑏𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑏𝑏 𝑓𝑓𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒+ 𝜀𝜀,                                                                                             (3) 
where the dependent variable, ΔLOANi,t+1 , is the quarterly change in total outstanding loans from 
the current to the next quarter. Consistent with the view that PU’s depressive effects on 
borrowers decrease their funding demands as well as banks’ credit supply, the results in the first 
column of Table 7 show that the coefficient on PU Indext is significantly negative, indicating 
that banks’ lending decreases in response to high PU.21 By including an interaction term (PU 
Indext×High) in Equation (3), where High is a dummy variable coded as 1 if current-quarter 
                                                          
21 This finding is consistent with that documented in Bordo et al. (2016). 
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loan loss provisions (LLPi,t) are greater than the quarterly median, we find that banks that 
accrued more loan loss provisions in the current quarter will reduce lending even more in the 
next quarter, as suggested by the significant negative coefficient on the interaction term in 
column (2). In short, the evidence in the first two columns shows that PU does have a negative 
effect on banks’ lending behavior and that accruing more loan loss provisions exacerbates it. 
Besides banks’ liquidity creation being directly captured by the change in outstanding 
loans, we also consider Berger and Bouwman’s (2009) total liquidity creation measure 
(TotalLCi,t+1) and liquidity creation through off-balance-sheet activities (OffBSLCi,t+1). 22  We 
replace the independent variable in Equation (3) with those two liquidity creation measures and 
report the results in the last four columns of Table 7. The results in columns (3) and (5) show that 
policy uncertainty is negatively associated with both measures of liquidity creation. 23 When 
adding the interaction term, PU Indext×High, into the regression model in columns (4) and (6), 
we find that the coefficients on the interaction terms are significantly negative for both liquidity 
creation measures. Therefore, using alternative measures of liquidity creation does not change 
our inferences.  
Collectively, the results in Table 7 show that PU has a real effect on banks’ liquidity 
creation activities and that the level of loan loss provisions plays an important role in moderating 
this effect. These findings further corroborate our economic-based explanation of the relation 
between PU and loan loss provisions. 
6. The effect of PU due to regulatory, fiscal and monetary policy 
                                                          
22 Berger and Bouwman (2009, p. 3840) report that “banks create almost half of their liquidity off the balance sheet.” 
23  In a concurrent paper using the same liquidity creation measures, Berger et al. (2018) also document that 
economic policy uncertainty harms the real economy through decreasing bank liquidity creation. 
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The results in the previous section strongly support the hypothesis that policy uncertainty 
affects loan loss provisioning through their expected depressive effects. In this section, we 
analyze whether the positive impact of policy uncertainty on loan loss provisioning depends on 
the type of policy generating the uncertainty. Baker et al. (2016) consider eleven category-
specific indices of policy uncertainty related to fiscal policy, taxes, government spending, 
monetary policy, regulation, financial regulation, health care, entitlement programs, national 
security, trade policy and sovereign debt. To obtain these measures, the authors count newspaper 
articles that contain search terms related to the specific type of policy in question in addition to 
the original search terms for the overall policy uncertainty index. Baker et al. (2016) and 
Bonaime et al. (2018) find that fiscal (including taxes and government spending), regulatory and 
monetary policy are most important generators of policy uncertainty.  
The model specification is the same as our main tests, e.g., we control for 
macroeconomic uncertainty and macro-level economic condition as well as several of the bank-
level determinants of loan loss provisions suggested by prior literature. To avoid the 
multicollinearity problem, we consider policy uncertainty due to regulatory, fiscal and monetary 
policy separately. Table 8 presents the results of this additional analysis. The regression results in 
columns (1) and (2) show that the level of banks’ loan loss provisions is positively associated 
with regulatory and fiscal policy uncertainty, respectively. Specifically, the coefficient on 
regulatory (fiscal) policy uncertainty is 0.0305 (0.0203) and both are statistically significant at 
the 1% level. As shown in column (3), the regression coefficient on monetary policy uncertainty 
is also positive although not significant. 
One might find the lack of a significant result for monetary policy uncertainty surprising. 
One explanation for the insignificant result is that uncertainty in monetary policy might have a 
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limited impact on loan loss provisions because monetary policy uncertainty, particularly 
uncertainty in interest rates, might have a limited effect on existing borrowers’ willingness and 
ability to repay their existing loans. In addition, borrowers and banks might be able to hedge 
against interest rate uncertainty via interest rate swaps or credit default swaps (Guay, 1999; 
Campello et al., 2011; Rampini et al., 2017), which, in turn, mitigates the likelihood and/or 
extent to which monetary policy uncertainty per se impacts future loan losses and thus current 
loan loss provisions. In contrast, it is likely to be more difficult to hedge against the potential 
depressive effects that arise in response to fiscal and regulatory policy uncertainty.24 
Overall, exploiting policy uncertainty due to the three most important types of specific 
policy, we provide additional evidence that policy uncertainty is positively associated with loan 
loss provisions. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate the association between PU and accrual estimates in the 
banking industry. Using a sample of all US commercial banks’ quarterly observations from 1996 
to 2016, we examine whether and how PU affects banks’ loan loss provisions. In our primary 
tests, we use the BBD (2016) overall PU index and find that the contemporaneous relation 
between PU and loan loss provisions is positive. Our results are both statistically and 
economically significant, consistent for each component of the overall PU index and robust to 
the instrumental variable approach and other robustness checks. 
Cross-sectional tests further suggest that the loan loss provisions of banks with higher 
risk and smaller prior reserves are likely to be more heavily affected by policy uncertainty. In 
                                                          
24 Further untabulated analyses of the relation between monetary policy uncertainty and loan loss provisions show 
that for banks with a high risk level or with low prior reserves, monetary policy uncertainty has a significantly 
positive effect on such banks’ loan loss provisions. Hence, while there is no signification association between 
monetary policy uncertainty and loan loss provisions on average, there is a positive association on certain subsets of 
banks. 
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addition to this corroborating evidence, by further linking policy uncertainty to future loan loss 
realization, we provide direct evidence that the positive association between PU and loan loss 
provisions reflects managers’ rational response to future economic conditions. Taken together, 
when policy uncertainty is high, bank managers rationally expect more loan losses to be realized 
in the future, leading them to accrue more loan loss provisions in the current quarter.  
This study adds to the growing body of PU literature by showing that policy uncertainty 
can also affect accrual estimates. It also contributes to the banking literature by examining the 
adverse effects of PU on banks’ loan portfolios. This is an important issue because the accrued 
loan losses can lead to a capital crunch and reduced lending in the economy (Beatty and Liao, 
2011), which, in turn, can magnify PU’s depressive effects. Our cross-sectional results shed new 
light on how banks can mitigate their loan portfolio exposure to PU.  
The positive association between PU and loan loss provisions indicates that when making 
loan loss provisions, at least some banks are already forecasting future loan losses in response to 
the current PU level. We believe that the results of this study should be of interest to standard 
setters and regulators, given the longstanding debate over accounting for credit losses (e.g., 
Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Beatty and Liao, 2011; Bushman and Williams, 2012; Bouvatier 
and Lepetit, 2012) and the newly introduced current expected credit loss model (FASB, 2016). 
Even though we have shown that bank managers rationally respond to PU by accruing more loan 
losses, it is still unclear whether and how PU impacts the accuracy of accrual estimates. We leave 
this question to future research.   
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions and Data Sources  
 
Variable Definition Data Source 
LLPi,t Loan loss provisions in quarter t scaled by the lagged total loans of bank 
i. 
Call Reports 
PU Indext The natural log of the quarterly average overall index of policy 
uncertainty in quarter t, divided by 100. The Policy Uncertainty Index is 
introduced in Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016). The overall PU index is 
constructed based on the weighted average of four components: the 
frequency of newspaper articles containing key terms related to policy 
uncertainty, uncertainty about future changes in the federal tax code 
measured by the dollar impact of tax provisions set to expire in the near 
future, the dispersion in the economic forecasts of government spending 
and the Consumer Price Index (CPI) as a proxy for uncertainty about 
future fiscal and monetary policy. 
Publicly 
available online: 
http://policyuncertain
ty.com 
MacroUncertaintyt Macroeconomic uncertainty constructed following Bonaime, Gulen and 
Ion (2018), i.e., the first principal component extracted from the 
following four variables: (1) the JLN uncertainty index developed by 
Jurado et al. (2015) as the unforecastable component in a system of 279 
macroeconomic variables; (2) the VXO index of implied volatility 
released by the Chicago Board Options Exchange; (3) the cross-sectional 
standard deviation of cumulative returns during the quarter using the 
entire CRSP universe and (4) the cross-sectional standard deviation of 
year-on-year sales growth using the entire Compustat quarterly universe. 
CBOE, CRSP, 
Compustat and 
JLN updated 
data: 
https://www.sydneylu
dvigson.com/data-
and-appendixes/ 
 
ΔNPLi,t-2 The change in nonperforming loans from quarter t-3 to quarter t-2 scaled 
by total loans in quarter t-3. 
Call Reports 
ΔNPLi,t-1 The change in nonperforming loans from quarter t-2 to quarter t-1 scaled 
by total loans in quarter t-2. 
Call Reports 
ΔNPLi,t The change in nonperforming loans from quarter t-1 to quarter t scaled 
by total loans in quarter t-1. 
Call Reports 
ΔNPLi,t+1 The change in nonperforming loans from quarter t to quarter t+1 scaled 
by total loans in quarter t. 
Call Reports 
SIZEi,t-1 The natural log of total assets at the end of quarter t-1. Call Reports 
ΔLOANi,t The change in total loans from quarter t-1 to quarter t scaled by total 
loans in quarter t-1. 
Call Reports 
EBPi,t Earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions in quarter t, scaled by 
lagged total loans. 
Call Reports 
COi,t Net charge-off in quarter t scaled by total loans. Call Reports 
CAPR1i,t-1 Tier 1 risk-adjusted capital ratio at the end of quarter t-1. Call Reports 
ALWi,t-1 Loan loss allowance in quarter t-1 scaled by total loans in quarter t-1. Call Reports 
EARNINGVOLi,t-1 Earnings volatility, calculated as the standard deviation of earnings 
before taxes and loan loss provisions (scaled by lagged total loans) 
Call Reports 
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during the past 12 quarters, i.e., from quarter t-12 to quarter t-1. 
HOMOGENEITYi,t The percentage of homogenous loans out of total outstanding loans at the 
end of quarter t. As in Liu and Ryan (2006), homogenous loans refer to 
consumer loans, mortgage loans secured by 1-4 family residential 
properties and loans to financial institutions and acceptances of other 
banks. 
Call Reports 
PUBLICi,t Dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is a public commercial bank or 
a subsidiary of a public bank holding company, 0 otherwise. 
Call Reports and 
NIC data  
INTCONTROLi,t Dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is subject to the FDICIA 
internal control provisions, i.e., if the bank is a US insured depository 
institution with total assets greater than $500 million, 0 otherwise. 
Call Reports 
GDPGRWt 100 times the change in real gross domestic product from quarter t-1 to 
quarter t scaled by GDP in quarter t-1. 
Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis 
UNEMPGRWt The change in the level of the unemployment rate from quarter t-1 to 
quarter t. 
US Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 
CSRETt The quarterly return on the S&P/Case Shiller US National Home Price 
Index, calculated as the change in the index level from quarter t-1 to 
quarter t scaled by the index level at the end of quarter t-1. 
Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis 
PartisanConflictt 
 
The partisan-conflict index of Azzimonti (2016) from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, which is based on a frequency count of 
newspaper articles containing terms related to lawmakers’ policy 
disagreements. We use this partisan-conflict index as the instrumental 
variable of policy uncertainty. 
Publicly 
available online: 
https://www.philadelp
hiafed.org/research-
and-data/real-time-
center/partisan-
conflict-index 
 
This table summarizes the definitions and data sources of the variables used in the regression analyses. 
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Figure 1. Accounting for credit losses 
 
This figure depicts the relationship between loan loss provisions, the loan loss allowance and loan charge-offs. 
When a loss-causing event occurs and the amount can be reasonably estimated, bank managers should estimate and 
present the loan loss provisions in the current period’s income statement. Loan loss reserves or allowance is a contra 
asset account to cumulate the estimated amount of loan losses. When the losses are confirmed in the future, charge-
offs will be made, i.e., to write down the outstanding loans and the corresponding proportion of loan loss reserves. 
Therefore, a natural link exists between loan loss provisions and future charge-offs, in the sense that a) loan loss 
provisions increase the pool of reserves while future charge-offs decrease it and, more importantly, b) loan loss 
provisions, as well as the reserves, are probable and estimated credit losses, while future charge-offs are actually 
realized losses. 
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Figure 2 
 PU index and the aggregate-level loan loss provisions 
 
This figure plots the quarterly median LLP, defined as loan loss provisions scaled by lagged total loans, with the 
BBD (2016) overall policy uncertainty index for the 1996Q2-2016Q4 sample period.  
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Table 1  
Panel A: Summary statistics  
 
 Mean S.D. 25% Median 75% 
LLPi,t 0.0010 0.0020 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 
PU Indext 0.0460 0.0030 0.0430 0.0460 0.0480 
MacroUncertaintyt 0.0030 0.0150 -0.0090 -0.0010 0.0120 
ΔNPLi,t-2 0.0000 0.0080 -0.0020 0.0000 0.0020 
ΔNPLi,t-1 0.0000 0.0080 -0.0020 0.0000 0.0020 
ΔNPLi,t 0.0000 0.0080 -0.0020 0.0000 0.0020 
ΔNPLi,t+1 0.0000 0.0080 -0.0020 0.0000 0.0020 
SIZEi,t-1 4.8430 1.2800 3.9650 4.7110 5.5480 
ΔLOANi,t 0.0210 0.0590 -0.0100 0.0160 0.0440 
EBPi,t 0.0070 0.0050 0.0040 0.0060 0.0090 
COi,t 0.0010 0.0020 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 
CAPR1i,t-1 0.1660 0.0820 0.1140 0.1410 0.1870 
ALWi,t-1 0.0160 0.0090 0.0110 0.0130 0.0180 
EARNINGVOLi,t-1 0.0050 0.0140 0.0010 0.0020 0.0030 
HOMOGENEITYi,t 0.3980 0.2210 0.2300 0.3690 0.5380 
PUBLICi,t 0.0990 0.2990 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
INTCONTROLi,t 0.1320 0.3380 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
GDPGRWt 0.6210 0.6400 0.2990 0.6780 0.9700 
UNEMPGRWt -0.0050 0.3000 -0.1670 -0.0670 0.0670 
CSRETt 0.0110 0.0170 0.0050 0.0150 0.0200 
Obs. 634,059 
 
Panel A presents the mean, standard deviation (S.D.), 25th percentile (25%), median and 75th percentile (75%) of 
the variables for the sample period from 1996Q2 to 2016Q4. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles. Variable definitions are summarized in Appendix A.  
 
  
 
 
Panel B: Pearson correlations 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 
1. LLPi,t 1              
2. PU Indext 0.159*** 1             
3. MacroUncertaintyt 0.145*** 0.244*** 1            
4. ΔNPLi,t-2 0.092*** 0.022*** 0.070*** 1           
5. ΔNPLi,t-1 0100*** 0.011*** 0.074*** -0.123*** 1          
6. ΔNPLi,t 0.061*** 0.008*** 0.076*** -0.036*** -0.120*** 1         
7. ΔNPLi,t+1 0.028*** -0.002 0.077*** -0.016*** -0.035*** -0.116*** 1        
8. SIZEi,t-1 0.101*** 0.123*** -0.078*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 1       
9. ΔLOANi,t 0.002* -0.154*** 0.009*** -0.019*** 0.004*** 0.069*** 0.024*** -0.032*** 1      
10. EBPi,t -0.027*** -0.159*** -0.002 -0.014*** -0.008*** -0.000 0.005*** 0.095*** 0.027*** 1     
11. COi,t 0.698*** 0.167*** 0.080*** 0.081*** 0.086*** -0.094*** -0.015*** 0.108*** -0.159*** -0.021*** 1    
12. CAPR1i,t-1 -0.036*** -0.023*** -0.043*** -0.026*** -0.024*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.278*** 0.065*** 0.197*** -0.057*** 1   
13. ALWi,t-1 0.220*** 0.113*** -0.060*** -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.060*** -0.071*** -0.016*** -0.120*** 0.092*** 0.364*** 0.136*** 1  
14. EARNINGVOL i,t-1 0.147*** 0.001 0.054*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.013*** -0.074*** 0.253*** -0.059*** 0.035*** 0.244*** 0.061*** 1 
15. HOMOGENEITYi,t -0.029*** -0.093*** 0.030*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.019*** -0.067*** 0.079*** 0.005*** 0.200*** -0.138*** -0.046*** 
16. PUBLICi,t 0.038*** -0.047*** 0.023*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.409*** 0.024*** 0.070*** 0.032*** -0.144*** 0.003** 0.001 
17. INTCONTROLi,t 0.088*** 0.059*** -0.042*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.705*** 0.004*** 0.076*** 0.091*** -0.145*** 0.035*** -0.008*** 
18. GDPGRWt -0.084*** -0.471*** -0.397*** -0.041*** -0.032*** -0.061*** -0.052*** -0.090*** 0.082*** 0.138*** -0.058*** 0.031*** 0.017*** -0.013*** 
19. UNEMPGRWt 0.130*** 0.303*** 0.747*** 0.078*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.080*** -0.005*** -0.016*** -0.067*** 0.073*** -0.044*** -0.065*** 0.036*** 
20. CSRETt -0.140*** -0.344*** -0.304*** -0.060*** -0.064*** -0.069*** -0.068*** -0.073*** 0.055*** 0.123*** -0.112*** 0.023*** -0.007*** -0.016*** 
 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.         
15. HOMOGENEITYi,t 1              
16. PUBLICi,t 0.014*** 1             
17. INTCONTROLi,t -0.013*** 0.403*** 1            
18. GDPGRWt 0.095*** 0.025*** -0.045*** 1           
19. UNEMPGRWt -0.036*** 0.004*** 0.002* -0.569*** 1          
20. CSRETt 0.093*** 0.020*** -0.043*** 0.465*** -0.423*** 1         
 
Panel B presents the Pearson correlation for each pair of variables. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions are 
summarized in Appendix A. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 2  
Main results (Test of H1): The relation between policy uncertainty and loan loss provisions 
 
Dep.Var. = LLPi,t 
 
(1)  
1st Comp. 
(2)  
2nd Comp. 
(3)  
3rd Comp. 
(4)  
4th Comp. 
(5)  
Overall PU 
(6) 
 
(7)  
Overall PU 
PU Indext 0.0187*** 
(2.82) 
0.0073*** 
(5.40) 
0.0485*** 
(3.89) 
0.0473*** 
(6.80) 
0.0473*** 
(6.70) 
 
 
0.0532*** 
(3.50) 
BELIEFSt  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0036*** 
(-3.44) 
0.0000 
(0.03) 
MacroUncertaintyt 0.0090*** 
(4.14) 
0.0123*** 
(5.69) 
0.0084*** 
(3.52) 
0.0089*** 
(4.60) 
0.0077*** 
(3.54) 
0.0142*** 
(4.12) 
0.0125*** 
(3.37) 
ΔNPLi,t-2 0.0126*** 
(11.37) 
0.0126*** 
(11.29) 
0.0124*** 
(11.61) 
0.0127*** 
(11.96) 
0.0128*** 
(11.53) 
0.0136*** 
(10.65) 
0.0137*** 
(10.89) 
ΔNPLi,t-1 0.0158*** 
(13.32) 
0.0159*** 
(13.05) 
0.0157*** 
(13.17) 
0.0161*** 
(13.56) 
0.0161*** 
(13.42) 
0.0163*** 
(12.28) 
0.0166*** 
(12.79) 
ΔNPLi,t 0.0365*** 
(16.46) 
0.0364*** 
(16.26) 
0.0363*** 
(16.43) 
0.0365*** 
(16.67) 
0.0367*** 
(16.45) 
0.0395*** 
(16.27) 
0.0395*** 
(16.34) 
ΔNPLi,t+1 0.0105*** 
(11.31) 
0.0104*** 
(10.83) 
0.0103*** 
(10.82) 
0.0107*** 
(11.08) 
0.0107*** 
(11.34) 
0.0106*** 
(10.10) 
0.0107*** 
(10.47) 
SIZEi,t-1 0.0000 
(0.38) 
-0.0000 
(-1.63) 
0.0000 
(0.98) 
-0.0000 
(-1.28) 
-0.0000 
(-1.31) 
0.0000 
(0.29) 
0.0000 
(0.08) 
ΔLOANi,t 0.0019*** 
(9.58) 
0.0019*** 
(10.12) 
0.0019*** 
(10.24) 
0.0020*** 
(10.70) 
0.0020*** 
(10.53) 
0.0012*** 
(4.52) 
0.0014*** 
(5.22) 
EBPi,t -0.0085** 
(-2.42) 
-0.0064* 
(-1.98) 
-0.0082** 
(-2.59) 
-0.0076** 
(-2.45) 
-0.0070** 
(-2.08) 
-0.0135*** 
(-3.09) 
-0.0137*** 
(-3.13) 
COi,t 0.6885*** 
(35.53) 
0.6864*** 
(36.21) 
0.6862*** 
(37.03) 
0.6842*** 
(37.73) 
0.6857*** 
(35.88) 
0.6935*** 
(30.45) 
0.6913*** 
(30.10) 
CAPR1i,t-1 0.0017*** 
(5.84) 
0.0017*** 
(6.05) 
0.0018*** 
(6.33) 
0.0017*** 
(6.09) 
0.0016*** 
(5.82) 
0.0020*** 
(4.58) 
0.0020*** 
(4.74) 
ALWi,t-1 -0.0319*** 
(-13.63) 
-0.0319*** 
(-13.05) 
-0.0318*** 
(-13.02) 
-0.0351*** 
(-13.37) 
-0.0338*** 
(-14.01) 
-0.0389*** 
(-9.45) 
-0.0405*** 
(-9.95) 
EARNINGVOLi,t-1 0.0125*** 
(19.36) 
0.0121*** 
(19.19) 
0.0124*** 
(19.74) 
0.0121*** 
(19.31) 
0.0122*** 
(19.29) 
0.0121*** 
(14.08) 
0.0117*** 
(13.77) 
HOMOGENEITYi,t -0.0004*** 
(-3.99) 
-0.0002** 
(-2.47) 
-0.0004*** 
(-3.76) 
-0.0004*** 
(-4.24) 
-0.0003*** 
(-3.56) 
-0.0004*** 
(-3.06) 
-0.0005*** 
(-3.13) 
PUBLICi,t -0.0000 
(-0.01) 
-0.0000 
(-0.36) 
-0.0000 
(-0.33) 
0.0000 
(0.89) 
0.0000 
(0.59) 
0.0000 
(0.50) 
0.0000 
(0.76) 
INTCONTROLi,t 0.0001*** 
(3.34) 
0.0001*** 
(4.22) 
0.0001*** 
(3.41) 
0.0001*** 
(3.87) 
0.0001*** 
(3.94) 
0.0001** 
(2.39) 
0.0001** 
(2.51) 
GDPGRWt 0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001** 0.0002** 0.0002** 
50 
 
 
(1.76) (1.76) (1.59) (0.95) (2.07) (2.02) (2.05) 
UNEMPGRWt 0.0000 
(0.24) 
-0.0000 
(-0.08) 
0.0001 
(0.51) 
0.0000 
(0.20) 
0.0001 
(0.42) 
-0.0003 
(-1.38) 
-0.0000 
(-0.05) 
CSRETt -0.0046*** 
(-3.14) 
-0.0034** 
(-2.34) 
-0.0017 
(-1.03) 
-0.0023** 
(-2.06) 
-0.0037*** 
(-3.01) 
-0.0020 
(-1.24) 
-0.0017 
(-1.28) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 634,059 634,059 634,059 634,059 634,059 41,8361 41,8361 
Adjusted R2 0.561 0.562 0.562 0.564 0.563 0.569 0.570 
 
This table presents the main results of regressing quarterly loan loss provisions on policy uncertainty. The dependent variable, LLPi,t, is defined as loan loss 
provisions in quarter t scaled by lagged total outstanding loans. The independent variable, PU Indext, is the natural log of the quarterly average PU index in 
quarter t. The first four columns consider each component of Baker, Bloom and Davis’ (2016) PU index and the other columns consider their overall PU index, 
which is the weighted average of the four components. All control variables are defined in Appendix A. Columns (6)-(7) present the results after further 
controlling for managerial sentiment (BELIEFSt) obtained from the Duke/CFO Magazine Global Business Outlook survey. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The model includes bank fixed effects; t-values, based on robust standard errors clustered by bank and quarter, are 
reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3 
Robustness checks 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (3) 
 IV-2SLS Removing 
recessions 
LLPi,t 
Removing  
crisis period 
LLPi,t 
 
Dep.Var. = 
1st stage 
PU Indext 
2nd stage 
LLPi,t 
PU Indext  
 
0.0342** 
(2.58) 
0.0519*** 
(7.53) 
0.0397*** 
(9.31) 
PartisanConflictt 0.7106*** 
(7.43) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MacroUncertaintyt 0.0834*** 
(3.52) 
0.0085*** 
(4.07) 
0.0065*** 
(3.86) 
0.0042*** 
(3.53) 
ΔNPLi,t-2 -0.0010 
(-0.63) 
0.0127*** 
(11.69) 
0.0118*** 
(9.05) 
0.0077*** 
(14.18) 
ΔNPLi,t-1 -0.0050** 
(-2.54) 
0.0160*** 
(13.42) 
0.0139*** 
(10.71) 
0.0102*** 
(13.55) 
ΔNPLi,t -0.0009 
(-0.49) 
0.0366*** 
(16.48) 
0.0327*** 
(14.17) 
0.0255*** 
(23.26) 
ΔNPLi,t+1 -0.0051*** 
(-2.75) 
0.0106*** 
(11.48) 
0.0090*** 
(8.56) 
0.0063*** 
(9.33) 
SIZEi,t-1 0.0005** 
(2.22) 
-0.0000 
(-0.36) 
-0.0001 
(-1.56) 
-0.0002*** 
(-7.47) 
ΔLOANi,t -0.0023*** 
(-3.65) 
0.0019*** 
(9.65) 
0.0020*** 
(10.14) 
0.0022*** 
(14.94) 
EBPi,t -0.0038 
(-0.38) 
-0.0076** 
(-2.20) 
-0.0030 
(-0.81) 
0.0061*** 
(2.73) 
COi,t 0.0701*** 
(4.37) 
0.6867*** 
(35.37) 
0.6620*** 
(30.60) 
0.6072*** 
(47.79) 
CAPR1i,t-1 -0.0014*** 
(-2.78) 
0.0017*** 
(5.96) 
0.0012*** 
(4.42) 
0.0010*** 
(3.45) 
ALWi,t-1 0.0305*** 
(5.47) 
-0.0330*** 
(-13.58) 
-0.0314*** 
(-14.36) 
-0.0326*** 
(-12.10) 
EARNINGVOLi,t-1 0.0093*** 
(5.82) 
0.0123*** 
(18.33) 
0.0128*** 
(19.91) 
0.0128*** 
(18.28) 
HOMOGENEITYi,t -0.0004 
(-0.90) 
-0.0004*** 
(-3.62) 
-0.0003*** 
(-2.74) 
-0.0001 
(-1.50) 
PUBLICi,t -0.0000 
(-0.73) 
0.0000 
(0.29) 
0.0000 
(0.53) 
-0.0000 
(-0.41) 
INTCONTROLi,t -0.0003*** 
(-3.95) 
0.0001*** 
(3.47) 
0.0001*** 
(3.25) 
0.0001*** 
(3.24) 
GDPGRWt -0.0008* 
(-1.79) 
0.0001** 
(2.08) 
0.0001** 
(2.20) 
0.0000 
(1.19) 
UNEMPGRWt 0.0011 
(0.90) 
0.0000 
(0.35) 
0.0003 
(1.30) 
-0.0000 
(-0.56) 
CSRETt -0.0063 
(-0.45) 
-0.0039*** 
(-2.95) 
-0.0050*** 
(-3.25) 
-0.0026** 
(-2.09) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 634,059 634,059 564,873 518,195 
Adjusted R2 0.588 0.562 0.550 0.527 
 
In this table, columns (1)-(2) present the results of the IV-2SLS estimation. The instrumental variable, 
PartisanConflictt, is Azzimonti’s (2016) partisan-conflict index from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 
which is based on a frequency count of newspaper articles containing terms related to lawmakers’ policy 
disagreements. Column (3) excludes observations during recession periods, as defined by NBER, while column (4) 
excludes observations during the crisis period from 2007Q1 to 2010Q4. All other variables are defined in Appendix 
A. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The model includes bank fixed effects; t-
values, based on robust standard errors clustered by bank and quarter, are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4  
Test of H2: The role of bank risk 
Dep.Var. = LLPi,t Nonperforming loan Loan diversification Capital adequacy 
 NPLi,t-1 LDIVi,t-1 CAPR1i,t-1 
PU Indext 0.0261*** 
(3.86) 
0.0630*** 
(7.56) 
0.0699*** 
(8.53) 
PU Indext×High 0.0494*** 
(8.89) 
-0.0296*** 
(-5.31) 
-0.0413*** 
(-7.44) 
High -0.0020*** 
(-8.22) 
0.0014*** 
(5.45) 
0.0019*** 
(7.26) 
MacroUncertaintyt 0.0074*** 
(3.35) 
0.0077*** 
(3.52) 
0.0070*** 
(3.26) 
ΔNPLi,t-2 0.0112*** 
(11.10) 
0.0128*** 
(11.63) 
0.0126*** 
(11.53) 
ΔNPLi,t-1 0.0138*** 
(13.33) 
0.0162*** 
(13.60) 
0.0160*** 
(13.57) 
ΔNPLi,t 0.0385*** 
(17.01) 
0.0365*** 
(16.50) 
0.0364*** 
(16.61) 
ΔNPLi,t+1 0.0121*** 
(12.87) 
0.0107*** 
(11.58) 
0.0106*** 
(11.48) 
SIZEi,t-1 -0.0000 
(-1.41) 
-0.0000 
(-1.24) 
-0.0001*** 
(-2.71) 
ΔLOANi,t 0.0021*** 
(11.60) 
0.0019*** 
(10.64) 
0.0021*** 
(11.25) 
EBPi,t -0.0059* 
(-1.75) 
-0.0075** 
(-2.24) 
-0.0071** 
(-2.08) 
COi,t 0.6794*** 
(35.90) 
0.6847*** 
(35.72) 
0.6830*** 
(35.83) 
CAPR1i,t-1 0.0017*** 
(5.87) 
0.0017*** 
(6.08) 
 
 
ALWi,t-1 -0.0374*** 
(-14.78) 
-0.0349*** 
(-14.30) 
-0.0334*** 
(-13.86) 
EARNINGVOLi,t-1 0.0126*** 
(20.07) 
0.0123*** 
(19.48) 
0.0136*** 
(21.96) 
HOMOGENEITYi,t -0.0004*** 
(-3.56) 
-0.0004*** 
(-3.75) 
-0.0003*** 
(-3.31) 
PUBLICi,t 0.0000 
(0.30) 
0.0000 
(0.40) 
0.0000 
(0.86) 
INTCONTROLi,t 0.0001*** 
(3.25) 
0.0001*** 
(3.32) 
0.0001*** 
(4.47) 
GDPGRWt 0.0001** 
(2.07) 
0.0001** 
(2.05) 
0.0001* 
(1.97) 
UNEMPGRWt 0.0001 
(0.41) 
0.0001 
(0.40) 
0.0001 
(0.39) 
CSRETt -0.0038*** 
(-3.04) 
-0.0037*** 
(-3.00) 
-0.0038*** 
(-3.17) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 634,059 630,608 634,059 
Adjusted R2 0.565 0.557 0.562 
This table presents the results of testing H2. In columns (1) and (2), we use two distinct measures to proxy for loan 
portfolio risk: Nonperforming loans (NPLi,t-1) measure the quality of the loan portfolio at the end of quarter t-1, 
calculated as nonperforming assets divided by total outstanding loans; Loan type diversification (LDIVi,t-1) is 
calculated as one minus the Herfindahl index of the distribution of real estate loans, commercial and industrial loans; 
loans to depository institutions; agricultural loans; loans to individuals and loans to foreign governments. In column 
(3), we consider the regulatory-capital-related risk (CAPR1i,t-1). To ease the interpretation of the coefficient on the 
interaction term, we create a dummy variable for each measurement according to its quarterly median value. The 
models include bank fixed effects; t-values, based on robust standard errors clustered by bank and quarter, are 
reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5  
Test of H3: The role of prior reserves 
 
Dep.Var. = LLPi,t Reserves adequacy measured by Reserves adequacy measured by 
 ALWt-1/NPLt-1 ALWt-1/COt-1 
PU Indext 0.0619*** 
(6.77) 
0.0563*** 
(6.78) 
PU Indext×High -0.0482*** 
(-7.13) 
-0.0381*** 
(-8.66) 
High 0.0019*** 
(6.39) 
0.0016*** 
(7.90) 
MacroUncertaintyt 0.0093*** 
(3.86) 
0.0095*** 
(3.99) 
ΔNPLi,t-2 0.0114*** 
(12.08) 
0.0140*** 
(12.93) 
ΔNPLi,t-1 0.0142*** 
(15.05) 
0.0178*** 
(15.45) 
ΔNPLi,t 0.0404*** 
(18.15) 
0.0393*** 
(17.83) 
ΔNPLi,t+1 0.0147*** 
(14.38) 
0.0135*** 
(12.61) 
SIZEi,t-1 0.0001* 
(1.82) 
0.0001 
(1.49) 
ΔLOANi,t 0.0013*** 
(8.02) 
0.0011*** 
(6.55) 
EBPi,t 0.0080** 
(2.27) 
0.0063 
(1.66) 
COi,t 0.6449*** 
(35.92) 
0.6516*** 
(36.06) 
CAPR1i,t-1 -0.0010*** 
(-5.28) 
-0.0010*** 
(-5.01) 
EARNINGVOLi,t-1 0.0089*** 
(11.92) 
0.0097*** 
(11.93) 
HOMOGENEITYi,t -0.0002* 
(-1.94) 
-0.0002* 
(-1.78) 
PUBLICi,t 0.0000 
(0.18) 
0.0000 
(0.43) 
INTCONTROLi,t -0.0000 
(-0.15) 
0.0000 
(0.93) 
GDPGRWt 0.0001** 
(2.10) 
0.0001** 
(2.15) 
UNEMPGRWt 0.0001 
(0.64) 
0.0001 
(0.64) 
CSRETt -0.0042*** 
(-3.29) 
-0.0042*** 
(-3.35) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes 
Obs. 578,924 537,535 
Adjusted R2 0.571 0.576 
 
This table presents the results of testing H3. The adequacy of the loan loss reserves is defined as the prior quarter 
loan loss allowance (ALWt-1) scaled by nonperforming loans (NPLt-1) or net charge-offs (COt-1). To ease the 
interpretation of the coefficient on the interaction term, we create a dummy variable for each measurement. The 
dummy variable (High) is coded as 1 if the corresponding value is greater than its quarterly median, 0 otherwise. All 
other variables are defined in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
The models include bank fixed effects; t-values, based on robust standard errors clustered by bank and quarter, are 
reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6  
Test of H4: The impact of PU on future charge-offs and the moderating effect of loan loss provisions 
 
Dep.Var. = COi,t+1  COi,t+1234 
 Without 
interaction 
Interact with 
High LLPi,t 
 Without 
interaction 
Interact with 
High LLPi,t 
PU Indext 0.0437*** 
(2.85) 
0.0103 
(0.86) 
 0.0833*** 
(2.68) 
-0.0336 
(-1.13) 
PU Indext×High  
 
0.0728*** 
(5.84) 
  
 
0.2548*** 
(6.49) 
High  
 
-0.0029*** 
(-5.07) 
  
 
-0.0102*** 
(-5.72) 
MacroUncertaintyt 0.0030 
(0.78) 
0.0030 
(0.78) 
 0.0344*** 
(4.59) 
0.0343*** 
(4.56) 
ΔNPLi,t-2 0.0217*** 
(10.10) 
0.0207*** 
(10.00) 
 0.0795*** 
(12.27) 
0.0764*** 
(12.34) 
ΔNPLi,t-1 0.0238*** 
(10.71) 
0.0228*** 
(10.72) 
 0.0985*** 
(13.44) 
0.0951*** 
(13.71) 
ΔNPLi,t 0.0339*** 
(12.71) 
0.0321*** 
(12.78) 
 0.1467*** 
(16.46) 
0.1406*** 
(16.96) 
ΔNPLi,t+1 -0.0197*** 
(-12.22) 
-0.0201*** 
(-12.92) 
 0.0824*** 
(10.72) 
0.0811*** 
(10.93) 
SIZEi,t-1 0.0002** 
(2.50) 
0.0001** 
(2.21) 
 0.0009*** 
(5.01) 
0.0008*** 
(4.63) 
ΔLOANi,t -0.0023*** 
(-12.08) 
-0.0025*** 
(-13.12) 
 -0.0074*** 
(-12.45) 
-0.0082*** 
(-13.47) 
EBPi,t -0.0055 
(-1.53) 
-0.0077** 
(-2.17) 
 -0.0514*** 
(-4.75) 
-0.0588*** 
(-5.44) 
COi,t 0.1411*** 
(11.27) 
0.1079*** 
(8.89) 
 0.5818*** 
(24.00) 
0.4728*** 
(20.11) 
CAPR1i,t-1 -0.0025*** 
(-10.41) 
-0.0024*** 
(-9.87) 
 -0.0071*** 
(-8.58) 
-0.0067*** 
(-8.20) 
ALWi,t-1 0.0748*** 
(18.18) 
0.0786*** 
(19.22) 
 0.2137*** 
(17.16) 
0.2253*** 
(18.37) 
EARNINGVOLi,t-1 0.0024*** 
(4.12) 
0.0012** 
(2.05) 
 0.0068*** 
(2.72) 
0.0031 
(1.24) 
HOMOGENEITYi,t 0.0006*** 
(4.16) 
0.0006*** 
(4.61) 
 0.0008* 
(1.94) 
0.0010** 
(2.40) 
PUBLICi,t -0.0000 
(-0.47) 
-0.0000 
(-0.43) 
 0.0003** 
(2.06) 
0.0003** 
(2.17) 
INTCONTROLi,t 0.0001*** 
(3.80) 
0.0001*** 
(3.54) 
 0.0004*** 
(3.15) 
0.0003*** 
(2.79) 
GDPGRWt 0.0001* 
(1.68) 
0.0001* 
(1.73) 
 0.0003* 
(1.72) 
0.0003* 
(1.74) 
UNEMPGRWt 0.0004* 
(1.82) 
0.0004* 
(1.92) 
 0.0010* 
(1.84) 
0.0010* 
(1.94) 
CSRETt -0.0085*** 
(-3.21) 
-0.0091*** 
(-3.39) 
 -0.0443*** 
(-7.44) 
-0.0462*** 
(-7.67) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Obs. 628,320 628,320  590,321 590,321 
Adjusted R2 0.311 0.320  0.477 0.488 
 
This table presents the results of testing H4. The dependent variables are net charge-offs, i.e., realized loan losses, in 
the following 1 and 4 quarters. The dummy variable (High) is coded as 1 if the loan loss provisions (LLPi,t) in 
quarter t are greater than the quarterly median, 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The models include bank fixed effects; t-values, 
based on robust standard errors clustered by bank and quarter, are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
55 
 
Table 7  
Test of H5: The effect of PU on future liquidity creation and the moderating effect of loan loss provisions 
 
Dep.Var. = ΔLOANi,t+1  TotalLCi,t+1  OffBSLCi,t+1 
 Without 
interaction 
Interact 
with High 
LLPi,t 
 Without 
interaction 
Interact 
with High 
LLPi,t 
 Without 
interaction 
Interact 
with High 
LLPi,t 
PU Indext -1.6045*** 
(-3.99) 
-1.3385*** 
(-2.94) 
 -0.7945 
(-1.58) 
-0.5065 
(-0.99) 
 -0.9171*** 
(-6.44) 
-0.5953*** 
(-4.33) 
PU Indext×High  
 
-0.5633*** 
(-2.90) 
  
 
-0.5534** 
(-1.98) 
  
 
-0.6550*** 
(-9.19) 
High  
 
0.0270*** 
(3.05) 
  
 
0.0327** 
(2.55) 
  
 
0.0310*** 
(9.43) 
MacroUncertaintyt -0.1243 
(-1.03) 
-0.1215 
(-1.01) 
 -0.9074*** 
(-5.07) 
-0.9021*** 
(-5.04) 
 -0.0858** 
(-2.32) 
-0.0830** 
(-2.25) 
ΔNPLi,t-2 -0.2030*** 
(-8.41) 
-0.2033*** 
(-8.47) 
 -0.0501 
(-1.51) 
-0.0601* 
(-1.83) 
 -0.0224* 
(-1.76) 
-0.0220* 
(-1.77) 
ΔNPLi,t-1 -0.1285*** 
(-4.96) 
-0.1289*** 
(-5.01) 
 0.0430 
(1.25) 
0.0314 
(0.93) 
 -0.0240* 
(-1.84) 
-0.0235* 
(-1.86) 
ΔNPLi,t -0.1115*** 
(-3.55) 
-0.1113*** 
(-3.63) 
 0.0029 
(0.07) 
-0.0163 
(-0.42) 
 -0.0598*** 
(-4.05) 
-0.0580*** 
(-4.16) 
ΔNPLi,t+1 0.3758*** 
(12.42) 
0.3765*** 
(12.53) 
 0.0604* 
(1.70) 
0.0585 
(1.66) 
 -0.0121 
(-0.96) 
-0.0109 
(-0.89) 
SIZEi,t-1 -0.0164*** 
(-8.68) 
-0.0163*** 
(-8.64) 
 0.0389*** 
(10.46) 
0.0389*** 
(10.54) 
 0.0033*** 
(3.78) 
0.0034*** 
(3.91) 
EBPi,t -0.0218 
(-0.26) 
-0.0246 
(-0.29) 
 -1.4778*** 
(-7.57) 
-1.5146*** 
(-7.72) 
 0.0898* 
(1.89) 
0.0878* 
(1.87) 
COi,t -2.4348*** 
(-22.47) 
-2.4490*** 
(-21.22) 
 -1.0800*** 
(-5.67) 
-1.4363*** 
(-7.04) 
 -0.5491*** 
(-9.89) 
-0.5400*** 
(-9.92) 
CAPR1i,t-1 0.1323*** 
(13.73) 
0.1329*** 
(13.82) 
 -0.6314*** 
(-41.08) 
-0.6291*** 
(-41.49) 
 -0.0232*** 
(-5.37) 
-0.0227*** 
(-5.34) 
ALWi,t-1 -0.7636*** 
(-12.65) 
-0.7436*** 
(-12.38) 
 -2.5865*** 
(-28.26) 
-2.4970*** 
(-27.35) 
 -0.6019*** 
(-18.75) 
-0.5828*** 
(-17.88) 
EARNINGVOLi,t-1 0.5870*** 
(25.13) 
0.5835*** 
(24.97) 
 0.1856*** 
(4.54) 
0.1625*** 
(4.00) 
 0.1083*** 
(8.40) 
0.1055*** 
(8.24) 
HOMOGENEITYi,t -0.0084** 
(-2.43) 
-0.0083** 
(-2.40) 
 -0.3696*** 
(-43.36) 
-0.3690*** 
(-43.36) 
 -0.0460*** 
(-17.84) 
-0.0459*** 
(-17.94) 
PUBLICi,t 0.0029*** 
(2.71) 
0.0030*** 
(2.76) 
 -0.0033 
(-1.09) 
-0.0031 
(-1.03) 
 0.0014 
(1.65) 
0.0015* 
(1.73) 
INTCONTROLi,t 0.0013 
(1.07) 
0.0014 
(1.20) 
 -0.0014 
(-0.53) 
-0.0012 
(-0.46) 
 -0.0004 
(-0.58) 
-0.0002 
(-0.32) 
GDPGRWt -0.0038* 
(-1.96) 
-0.0038* 
(-1.96) 
 -0.0108*** 
(-3.44) 
-0.0107*** 
(-3.42) 
 -0.0023*** 
(-3.04) 
-0.0023*** 
(-3.03) 
UNEMPGRWt 0.0013 
(0.25) 
0.0014 
(0.25) 
 0.0097 
(1.16) 
0.0100 
(1.20) 
 0.0021 
(1.21) 
0.0021 
(1.22) 
CSRETt 0.0982 
(1.59) 
0.0984 
(1.60) 
 0.2532*** 
(2.87) 
0.2480*** 
(2.81) 
 0.0454 
(1.61) 
0.0460 
(1.63) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Obs. 628,223 628,223  551,346 551,346  551,346 551,346 
Adjusted R2 0.186 0.187  0.855 0.855  0.757 0.758 
 
This table presents the results of testing H5. The dependent variables are the change in outstanding loans from 
quarter t to quarter t+1 (ΔLOANi,t+1) and the liquidity creation measures introduced in Berger and Bouwman (2009), 
including total liquidity creation (TotalLCi,t+1) and the proportion from off-balance-sheet activities (OffBSLCi,t+1). 
The dummy variable (High) is coded as 1 if the loan loss provisions (LLPi,t) in quarter t are greater than the quarterly 
median, 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentiles. The models include bank fixed effects; t-values, based on robust standard errors clustered 
by bank and quarter, are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
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Table 8  
Additional analysis: The effect of policy uncertainty due to regulatory, fiscal and monetary policy 
 
 
Dep.Var. =  
(1)  
LLPi,t 
(2)  
LLPi,t 
(3)  
LLPi,t 
Regulatory PUt 0.0305*** 
(5.88) 
  
Fiscal PUt  
 
0.0203*** 
(5.31) 
 
 
Monetary PUt   0.0032 
(0.63) 
MacroUncertaintyt 0.0078*** 
(3.68) 
0.0094*** 
(5.00) 
0.0102*** 
(4.32) 
ΔNPLi,t-2 0.0127*** 
(11.29) 
0.0127*** 
(11.23) 
0.0124*** 
(11.08) 
ΔNPLi,t-1 0.0161*** 
(13.29) 
0.0160*** 
(13.31) 
0.0156*** 
(13.02) 
ΔNPLi,t 0.0366*** 
(16.35) 
0.0365*** 
(16.25) 
0.0364*** 
(16.34) 
ΔNPLi,t+1 0.0106*** 
(11.06) 
0.0106*** 
(11.08) 
0.0103*** 
(10.88) 
SIZEi,t-1 -0.0000 
(-0.78) 
0.0000 
(0.32) 
0.0001 
(1.44) 
ΔLOANi,t 0.0020*** 
(10.38) 
0.0020*** 
(10.51) 
0.0019*** 
(9.44) 
EBPi,t -0.0074** 
(-2.27) 
-0.0083** 
(-2.46) 
-0.0093*** 
(-2.74) 
COi,t 0.6857*** 
(36.44) 
0.6864*** 
(35.70) 
0.6890*** 
(35.79) 
CAPR1i,t-1 0.0017*** 
(5.91) 
0.0017*** 
(6.15) 
0.0017*** 
(6.13) 
ALWi,t-1 -0.0336*** 
(-13.47) 
-0.0333*** 
(-13.79) 
-0.0309*** 
(-12.85) 
EARNINGVOLi,t-1 0.0123*** 
(19.27) 
0.0122*** 
(19.35) 
0.0126*** 
(19.54) 
HOMOGENEITYi,t -0.0004*** 
(-3.92) 
-0.0004*** 
(-4.10) 
-0.0004*** 
(-4.20) 
PUBLICi,t 0.0000 
(0.63) 
0.0000 
(0.25) 
-0.0000 
(-0.49) 
INTCONTROLi,t 0.0001*** 
(3.70) 
0.0001*** 
(3.58) 
0.0001*** 
(3.08) 
GDPGRWt 0.0001** 
(2.08) 
0.0001** 
(2.04) 
0.0001 
(1.38) 
UNEMPGRWt 0.0001 
(0.62) 
-0.0000 
(-0.04) 
0.0000 
(0.12) 
CSRETt -0.0025** 
(-2.16) 
-0.0047*** 
(-3.61) 
-0.0044*** 
(-2.73) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 634,059 634,059 634,059 
Adjusted R2 0.563 0.562 0.561 
 
This table presents the additional analysis of regressing quarterly loan loss provisions on specific types of policy 
uncertainty. The dependent variable, LLPi,t, is defined as loan loss provisions in quarter t scaled by lagged total 
outstanding loans. The variables of interest are the natural log of regulatory, fiscal and monetary PU index in quarter 
t. All control variables are defined in Appendix A. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. The model includes bank fixed effects; t-values, based on robust standard errors clustered by bank and 
quarter, are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
